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There will be three chapters in this thesis. The first two will compare and contrast 
how six different biographers treat their subject Michael Collins and the surrounding 
political context in which he worked. This thesis is not concerned with the quality of 
the research in the books. It merely focuses on how they vary and compare in their 
expression.
These biographers can be categorised into three different sections. Firstly those who 
themselves were active nationalists during the period 1916 - 1922. Piaras Beaslai, 
Frank O Connor, Leon O Broin and Desmond Ryan fill this category. Secondly, the 
biography of Margery Forester who is writing from a foreign perspective. Finally, a 
biography from an Irish historian of a later generation, Tim Pat Coogan.
There are in excess of twenty historians who deal significantly with the life and work 
of Michael Collins. But due to the size and time constraints imposed on this work it 
is necessary to focus on just six. These however are probably the most popular and 
between them it is possible to correlate certain traditionally nationalist trends, as 
regards history writing on Ireland. It will be shown how all the biographers support 
the ideals of Irish nationalism, and how they support violence as means to achieving 
Irish independence. Though in some of them this is expressed, only, tacitly. 
Regarding the character of Collins, certain books, are more revealing and objective 
than others.
The study will exclude the biographers treatment of the tmce and Treaty period. The 
primary reason for this is the time restriction. The two main periods to be 
considered, therefore, will be the War of Independence and the Civil War. In their 
treatment of the Civil War all the biographers support Michael Collins and the pro- 
treatyite side. From the nationalist point of view the villain is more obvious in the 
War of Independence than in the Civil War. With this in mind, an ongoing theme 
will be the amount of variance that exists over the treatment of de Valera in these 
biographies.
They are all written in a chronological format. Therefore it is also convenient for the 
first two chapters to work within a chronological framework. The first and largest 
of these chapters will cover the commentary on Collins from his childhood to the
truce in 1921. The second will cover the Civil War up to Collins’ assignation on 22 
August, 1922.
Not all the biographies cover all the periods in Collins life. Therefore there will be 
more focus on certain biographies, during different phases of the thesis.
The third and final chapter in the thesis will reflect how the dimension of film has 
expressed itself on the subject of Michael Collins. The two sources to be considered 
here are the Neil Jordan movie ‘Michael Collins’ and the RTE/Thamas production, 
‘The Treaty’. Jordan’s film is a cinematic experience designed for mass audiences. 
As such it aroused controversy in the media on several levels. It will be shown, 
how despite this controversy its basic message is the same as that expressed in the 
books.
The following section introduces the biographies and films used in this work. 
PIARAS BEASLAI
Piaras Beaslai was a close friend of Michael Collins and worked by his side during 
the War of Independence and the Irish Civil War. His most notable occupation 
during the period was as editor of "An tOglach’. This was the principal publication 
for the Volunteers. He expresses more ardent nationalism in his writing than any 
other of the biographers, and is the most resentful of the British administration. He 
is totally committed to Collins’s decision and his disgust with de Valera runs 
rampant.
»
He doesn’t appear to be as critical of de Valera in his second work which was 
published while de Valera was in government.
He wrote two biographies on Michael Collins. His first, ‘Michael Collins and the 
making o f a new Ireland’ which was first published in 1937, in two volumes as 
early as 1926. It is a much longer and more scathing work than his second 
biography ‘Michael Collins - soldier and statesman’ which was first published in 
1937, in one volume.
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1The first was written very shortly after the Civil war, when there was still a lot of 
hostility in the country. It is written as a justification of Collins’s life work and of 
the treatyite side during the Civil War. He says he received co-operation and was 
complimented for his ‘candour and fairness’ by men who had fought on the anti­
treaty side. The sensitivities of the time, however, are highlighted by his claim that 
‘my house was raided by armed and massed men and two chapters of the manuscript 
of my book carried off on the signed founder of the gentlemen who is now one of 
Mr. de Valera’s cabinet minister’. He admits that there are some errors in his first 
work but that these are trivial and only related to minor details which are mostly of 
‘personal rather than historic interest’. Regarding his second work, he points out 
that even after sixteen years it is impossible to discuss the period calmly and candidly 
with certain politicians. He claims that he is writing from a neutral stand point and 
that his ‘only desire is to record facts truly and to do justice to the memory of a great 
Irishman who I knew well. I have endeavoured not to obtrude my own view on
I
controversial topics. I am more concerned with recording facts than advocating 
opinions.’1 He will be assessed according to this declaration.
FRANK O CONNOR
Frank O Connor is a pseudonym of Michael O Donovan who was born in Cork in 
1903. He started writing at a very young age. He became librarian, first in Co. 
Cork, then in Dublin. His short stories have earned him a worldwide reputation. 
He says that writing his biography, 'The Big Fellow’ was a ‘labour of love’, but 
also, in part an ‘act of reparation’. He admits the latter because he himself fought on 
the anti-treaty side in the Civil War. With such a history it is understandable that his 
criticism of de Valera is slight. He claims that he has ‘taken no pains whatever to 
conceal the fact that Collins was a human being, that he took a drink, swore and lost 
his temper. It is not as though there were anything to conceal’ .2 He will be tested 
on this statement. ‘The Big Fellow ' was first published in 1937.
LEON O’ BROIN
Leon O’ Broin was a writer, broadcaster, historian and public servant. He was 
active in the national movement prior to the Treaty and served in various government 
department before becoming Secretary of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs.
t
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O’Broin didn’t write his work, ‘Michael Collins’ until 1980, a date much later than 
any of the other biographers who were Collins’ contempories. While he supports 
Collins and his actions he is perhaps the most willing of all the biographers to show 
his darker side without striving to justify it. ,
DESMOND RYAN
Desmond Ryan, the literary executor of Padraig Pearse, was a pupil of his in St., 
Enda’s College, Rathfarnham, and fought with him in the G.P.O. in 1916. To him 
Collins is a hero of great proportion. His style is typical of old Irish poetry with a 
fascination for the physical appearance of those whom he attempts to depict. Like 
the biographies of Beaslai and O Connor, Ryan’s was written in the 1930’s, in an 
environment subjected to the, sensitivities of post Civil War Ireland. It was first 
published in 1932 as ‘The Invisible Arm y,’ and was later renamed ‘Michael’ 
Collins’. This book is written from the perspective of various people involved in 
Collins’ network. The validity of the way he represents and quotes these people and 
the value of his work as history has to be called into question, but he certainly 
creates a raw atmosphere which contributes immensely to an understanding of the 
time. He is unfair in his generalisation of women in this book but at least he weights 
their political significance which is more than can be said for most of the biographers 
and the two films under discussion. In an attempt to detect a common nationalist 
psyche that might exist among these biographers, their appraisal of women will be 
analysised. Ryan is interested in activities on the ground level and describes them 
as if they were part of a novel. He is more interested in recreating the atmosphere at 
this level than in factually tracing events or in penetrating the higher political sphere.
t
MARGERY FORESTER
Margery Forester was born in Auckland, New Zealand, in 1936. She moved to 
Britain in 1957, but didn’t visit Ireland until 1961. Her great-grandmother had 
emigrated from the country in 1841. It was this visit to Ireland that made her aware 
of Michael Collins. She became .interested in his life and soon this interest becomes 
passionate. Her biography ‘Michael Collins - The lost leader 'was first published in 
1971.
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T.P. COOGAN
T.P. Coogan, historian and journalist, was editor of the Irish Press for twenty years. 
It may seem peculiar therefore that he is so strongly critical of de Valera not only in 
this biography but also in another biography on de Valera himself. Of the six 
biographers he is the most revealing on de Valera and apart from Beaslai the most 
vicious towards him. While Coogan was not a contempory of Collins’, he is linked 
to him through his father. When he was a child Collins’ named ‘crackled in the 
background’.3 His father had been a close friend of David Neligan, who was one of 
the most important double agents assisting Collins during the War of Independence.
Coogan is an ardent nationalist who prefers to consider Collins a ‘freedom fighter’ 
rather than an ‘urban terrorist’ A While he directs the reader according to his own 
well established bias, his book is the best researched of all the biographers and it is 
the most informative. As a result of this he manages to provide the reader with 
enough information to make up his/her own mind. This will be highlighted 
throughout the course of the thesis. Of all.the biographers he is the only one who 
significantly praises the contributions of women to Irish nationalism. His biography 
is titled ‘Michael Collins’.
THE NEIL JORDAN MOVIE
Jordan released his film in 1996. To accompany the film, Jordan also realised the 
final draft of his screenplay and a film diary. It is beneficial to have the screenplay 
as it verbally depicts the images he wants to display. As well as this, during the 
course of the film production Jordon made various day-to-day changes, with scenes 
been left out or altered. This can broaden to a certain degree our impressions of his 
intention for the movie.
The film diary allows us to penetrate his opinion of Michael Collins and the 
perspective from which he makes his movie. The film and screenplay glorify 
Collins as a freedom fighter, encapsulating his work and contributions to the country 
from 1916-1922, the year of his death in approximately two hours of celluloid. 
Jordan accompanies Coogan and Beaslai in his less than complimentary portrayal of
de Valera. The British are seen in a completely negative light. There is not one 
sympathetic British character in the entire film. Due to its running time and the fact 
that is has to sell as an entertainment piece, his historical account has to be altered 
and condensed. This is inevitable.
Naturally however, this approach can be manipulated to suit and benefit the 
director’s vision of history. All cinema is to some degree fiction. Even in a scene 
which attempt to recreate an event that actually occurred the visual display is 
inevitably different to the actual event. In reality we all perceive independently. On 
the screen we see through the directors eye. The historian also possesses this power 
but he is obliged to back his vision up with fact. Jordan who has the licence to alter 
and condense fact should do so without gravely contradicting history, as his film 
claims to represent history. It is on this footing,that the film and screenplay should 
be analysed.
THE TREATY
The screenplay for this RTE/Thames production was written by Brian Phelan. The 
historical consultants were Tim Pat Coogan, Prof. R.F. Forester, John Greek, Lord 
Longford and Prof. T.P. O Neil. This is interesting because both Coogan and 
Forester have voiced discontent to certain aspects of the Jordan film. This 
production was released on television in 1991. It is very unbiast in its sympathies 
which is reflected as much in the collaboration of its production as it is in anything 
else.
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tCHAPTER 1
CHILDHOOD
Frank O Connor remarks that from the point of view of a novelist Collins’ youth 
would be the most intriguing period of his life: ‘In this we see the first threshings of 
his genius in a world which did not recognise it.’5
Beaslai, O Broin, Forester and Coogan all outline an historical overview of the 
environment into which Collins was born, complimented by a history 'of his family 
or clan, the O Coileain. The political background of the Land Question, the Home 
Rule campaign and the effect of these on Cork and the country as a whole are 
analysed. The British administration is highly criticised in these areas. Beaslai is the 
most nationalistic in this regard. He creates a strict dichotomy between the good and 
the bad players. The Irish perspective is totally glorified from where
I
there1 proved to be an unextinguishable spark in Irish nationality’.6
Forester proves to be somewhat objective when she accepts that Gladstone who 
worked ‘selflessly and honourably’, achieved some good developments in the Irish 
interest. George Wyndam is seen to have his ‘whole heart for Ireland’. She even 
manages to comment favourably on Balfour.7
Frank O Connor approaches the political history of Ireland through the more 
colourful use of analogy. In strong contrast to Beaslai’s description a hassle-free 
Ireland and its mentality is cynically referred to as Jonathan Swift’s fictional creation 
of Lilliput. This counter acted the Intellectuals stance. It was overpowered at the 
end of the in nineteenth century by the activities of Parnell and his Party but had 
managed to regain its influence through such ‘vague causes’ as the neutrality of 
Belgium and other such safe dilemmas created by the first World War. ‘Give such a 
cause, involving no searching of the heart, no tragedy, it can almost belieye itself 
human.’ Accordingly the Intellectuals now saw revolution as being their last chance 
to overthrow Lilliput and British rule.
All the biographers who cover this initial period of his life place the effect of the
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close net community spirit and patriotism of his surrounding environment as being 
an integral part of the future man. According to Margery Forester it was to be the 
‘ key to all he was later to become’.9
The same childhood traits of generosity, empathy, athletic acumen, physical 
strength, kindheartedness, fearlessness and a respect for firm discipline are 
expressed by the biographers. The books generally attest to his immense capacity 
for reading, even as a child, particularly though not completely nationalist in its 
content. Therefore we get an almost set picture of the positive attributes of the child. 
This is seen to be the unmolded potential of the future leader.
Coogan and Forester propose a sense of destiny or an aura of protection when they 
connect a near death escape on his childhood with a series of close escapes from the 
British in his adulthood. This childhood incident occurred when he fell through an 
open trapdoor disguised by a covering of flowers, only to be cushioned in his 
landing.
The general picture therefore is of a pleasant and gifted child living in an 
environment that would justify his later action.
LONDON
Away from the innocence of childhood and the country community Collins’s 
reaction to the vices of London and early adulthood are treated at variance if dealt 
with.
According to Beaslai, London presented little appeal to Collins’ curiosity.>o While 
O’Connor admits that the city provided Collins with the opportunity to escape from 
the straight-jacket of the conservative lifestyle that had been forced onto him at 
home, he claims in the old puritan outlook to which Beaslai was also accustomed, 
that he never in his new found freedom drank to excess.11 O Broin again a 
contempory of Collins, though a more objective biographer, accepts that Collins was 
susceptible to the ‘wildness’ of London but that this experience was more or less a 
superficial one and was merely a reflection of his passage through adolescence.
Coogan goes as far as to admit a temporary association with a hard drinking 
crowd.12
By enlarge, though, we see the same young adult developing in London. His 
loyalty in friendship, his willingness to tease but inability to be teased, his strong 
grasp on reality, his flash temper, his lack of prejudice, his likability, his inability to 
bear a grudge, his lust for education and the learning of Irish, his wholehearted 
approach to everything he does, his vast energy and restlessness and the necessity of 
getting things his own way are the main developing traits described by most of the 
biographers.
It is also generally admitted that his confidence, cockiness and desire for leadership 
did not appeal to everyone. Beaslai proves to be the least willing to illuminate what 
could be considered his less desirable traits.
While his attractiveness to women is usually mentioned it is only significantly 
elaborated on by Coogan who himself notes the neglect of this area in previous 
biographies. He is the only one for example to mention Collins’s relationship with 
Ms. Kileen. This contrasts with Beaslai’s - ‘The society of girls had apparently no 
attraction for him.’ Sexuality, perhaps, is to daring a venture for the conservative 
biographers to detail.^
Collins is generally portrayed at this stage as being the raw material for leadership1
rather than the developed form but the importance of his London experience is put 
down to being the place where he developed the clerical and financial parts of his 
brain and where he developed his nationalism and his nationalist connections in an 
incredibly short space of time. In other words it is where he developed the 
mechanisms for future leadership.
Collins’s bout of anti-clericism, while in London, is expressed in slightly different 
ways. Forester claims that it lacked the ‘complication of atheism’. 14 Coogan states 
that he always enjoyed a strong faith and that he was only going through the usual 
Republican period of anti-clericism while O Connor reasons that it was due to his 
desire to lead. >5
9
There is certain ambiguity relating to Collins’ return to Ireland just before the Rising 
in 1916. Forester, and O’ Connor make out that he was not yet significantly 
involved enough in the Republican movement so as to be personally notified as to 
the revolutionary plans but that through his own speculation returned to Ireland to 
verify rumours that abounded in London at the time.16
Beaslai however, can’t resist the opportunity to exaggerate the importance of 
Collins, in relation to this historically significantly insurrection. ‘The fact was that 
Collins like other members of the I.R.B. had received a summons from Sean 
MacDiarmada to return to Ireland.’17
The more reliable research of Coogan, does however, suggest Collins’ possible 
involvement in the Volunteer gun running. He has also unearthed loose evidence to 
suggest that perhaps he intended on going to Germany with Roger Casement though 
he concludes that he never actually took part in this journey. Coogan also claims that 
it was possible that Collins was in direct contact with Devoy before the 1916 
Rising.1»
THE RISING
At this time when Collins was involved with Joseph Plunkett and his father Count 
Plunkett he was sharing accommodation with some of his own relatives. These, 
according to Forester, represent the opposite world from which Michael was 
engaged in, the world of the vast majority of Irish people. Her impression of this 
world equates very much with Frank O’ Connors Lilliput, which has been described 
earlier. Forester describes these relatives as being - ‘....part of the predominantly 
complacent Irish life which, if it grumbled at the rising cost of living, found the
living itself well enough to its liking  It cheered its sons as they went of in
British uniforms to France and turned from the window when the Irish Volunteers 
swung past on a weekend route march.’ >9 This shows that Forester as well as O’ 
Connor is at least willing to allow a cynicism of the Irish culture enter his nationalist 
outlook.
Collins’ contribution during the 1916 Rising isn’t to well documented because of his 
relative anonymity at the time. O Broin accepts that Collins’ part in the Rising was
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small, though a ‘ part which he played with conspicuous successes of ability
I
and efficiency.’20 Both he and Coogan quote Desmond Fitzgerald describing Collins 
as - ‘....the most active and efficient officer in the place. ’ 21 Forester compliments
this view by saying that the- ‘ impression left by him on those who did notice
him is one of efficiency : the organiser at work.’22 Beaslai in his typical mode of 
hero worship doesn’t suggest any lack of information regarding Collins’s activities 
during the Easter week. He merely stresses that Collins-’....was one of the hardest 
workers throughout the strenuous week.’ 23 Desmond Ryan, of all the biographers, 
is the most personally related to the episode in Collins’s life as he too fought in the 
G.P.O. during the Rising, though they didn’t meet. His observations on Collins’ 
role during the revolt reflects a hyperbolic old Irish poetic style in which his persona
develops a folklorish and mythological dimension.’ An awesome Spectra........
‘t'was MANANNAN MAC LIR, Fir Phantom of Rathcroghan, who had come 
to save them in the dire strait in which they were.’24
In many respects and in many areas it is O’ Broin who proves to be the most 
objective observer of Collins. He doesn’t always feel the nedessity to justify 
Collins’s flaws. He tells the reader how he failed to impress some of the Volunteers 
at Kimmage on Easter Monday in his attempts to instruct them. ‘They thought “he 
was throwing his weight about a bit”  ’25
We are introduced at this stage to one of the more striking of the on running themes 
in the thesis. That is, how the biographers portray de Valera. Forester and Coogan
introduce him into their works at this point. Forester refer to his ‘ reckless
unconcern for personal safety..’ and his leadership qualities and responsibilities.26 
In contrast to this Coogan’s introduction of de Valera is in line with how he wishes 
to continue with his assessment of him. His dislike for the man is adamantly 
expressed in his separate biography on him and he loses none of his venom in this 
Michael Collins tribute. He unveils a cover up concerning a nervous breakdown that 
de Valera endured during the Rising. The degree of this cover up is signified by a 
story in which a Captain Michael Cullen was worried that de Valera might have 
suffered another breakdown whilst quarrelling with John Devoy. He- 
‘...approached...Dr. Tom O’ Higgins warning him first that he would shoot him if 
he ever mentioned the story to anyone, told him what had happened and asked him
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for a medical opinion on de Valera’s condition’. Coogan also claims that in his own 
official biography de Valera exaggerates his own role in the Rising. According to 
Coogan, de Valera’s real power stemmed from the reputation he achieved as a result 
of the Rising. Coogan’s de Valera does not possess the leadership qualities and 
bravery of Forester’s description.27 As Collins’ and de Valera’s relationship
develops the other biographers make contributions regarding de Valeras character. 
As will be shown later, Beaslai’s dislike for de Valera and his politics is as strong as 
Coogans, if not stronger.
The way the Volunteers were treated after the rebellion is divided between those 
biographers who view the whole picture and those who take a more on-sided 
approach.
Forester accepts that the British soldiers generally treated their prisoners with respect 
and gives several examples of this good behaviour. She points out however that 
Collins- ‘....watched as a private from among their guards was prevented from 
giving water to his thirsty prisoners’, and how ‘..nearby Sean MacDiarmada had his 
stick stuck from his with a taunt and a rough jostle.’ It is the higher administration 
she condemns. John Maxwell the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief who 
‘needed neither prayer nor pronouncement’ and who had his prisoners enclosed ‘by 
a ring of bayonets, under drenching cold rain and an intense sun..’ The majority of 
detectives, whose job it was to round up the main instigators are seen to be vulture
like. They ‘prowled round’ trying to ‘unearth their pray pouncing here and
there amongst the men’, and sometimes seizing the wrong man.28
Desmond Ryan recreates a scene between two detectives and two prisoners which 
shines a different light on the situation. ‘ “I knew you well, Mr. Macken!” the 
second detective was saying. “Didn’t you wire my sister-in-laws house, and a damn 
fine job you made of it. Let the pair of you say you were caught in the row by 
accident and we’ll get you out. A tradesman and a journalist, nothing easier.” ‘29
Coogan focuses on the actual atrocities caused by the British and on the behaviour of 
Lee Wilson, he doesn’t condemp the British here, without good reason.30
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It is in the writings of O’Connor and Beaslai that we get the ultimate form of 
condemnation. O’Connor gloats about the subsequent assassination of Wilson. 
‘There would be a day of reckoning for that, and then there would be no more 
romantic outbursts which left them to the mercy of sadistic savages. It was the 
savages who would go in fear, and one fine spring morning that gallant officer 
would meet a most unromantic end up in a quiet road in County Wexford.’3i
Beaslai is equally vengeful when he comments on the detectives picking out men for 
the firing squad. ‘Anybody who had seen that sight may be pardoned if he felt little 
compunction at the subsequent shooting of those same “G” men. ’32
All the biographers agree that the initial reception by the civilian population towards 
the rebels was hostile.
INTERNMENT
The biographers tend to draw pretty much a similar picture of Collins’ internment in 
Stafford and Frongoch regarding his mentality, development and the situation that 
surrounded him there. His adaptability, incredible energy for sport and study, the 
growing recognition of his leadership qualities, how he used his sojourn 
productively, how his experience with smuggling which appealed to his nature 
helped start his intelligence network, how his flash tempers resulted in coaxing from 
the other prisoners and often , resulted in wrestling matches, how Frongoch 
‘University’ helped to further enrich his nationalistic tendencies, how he maintained 
his boyishness and lightheartedness and how this enabled him to switch suddenly 
from seriousness to good humour, are the traits commonly referred to by the 
biographers in this section. This is, by and large, put in a way that compliments 
Collins’ character. His failure to tolerate the moderates in the prison is mentioned 
by most of the biographers but it is Coogan who proves to be the most critical of this 
intolerance. This inability to show to his peers in speech the restraint he displayed to
the young and the old  was to make a dangerous enemy for Collins’.33
However this perceived flaw is seen to be detrimental to his own person rather than 
to any one elses.
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On Collins’s release from prison Coogan is the only one who mentions that he was 
as ‘drunk as a lord’ when he left Dublin on the Cork train.34 According to O’ Broin 
Collins went straight to Cork. 35 Beaslai also skips the episode. ‘After a few hours
in the capital he proceeded to Clonikilty ’36 Those who deal with his stay in
Cork, after his release, comment on the general hostility he experienced there as a 
result of the Rising, except for Beaslai though he does mention the general level of 
hostility in the country. 37 Forester condemns them for this claiming that the- 
‘....little bit of material prosperity has ruined them’.38
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COLLINS’S RISE TO POWER
After returning to Dublin, Collins is already portrayed as carrying significant weight 
amongst the released internees. But Collins’s first position of real power, and the 
one which allowed him national influence, was as Secretary to the National Aid 
Association.
The biographers testify to his abundant energy and activity by describing his rapid 
incline in importance and consequently his vast and diverse responsibilities. He 
quickly became prominent in the I.R.B., the Volunteers, and made immense 
contributions towards the organisation of these bodies. He was also one of the main 
engineers of the under ground Irish nationalist networks that were developing in 
England at this time as well as strengthening links with Clan na nGael in America.
The comments made by the biographers about Collins’ character during this stage are 
generally complimentary, though all are unreserved in the workplace. This however 
is a criticism within the personal sphere rather than the political one.
O’Connor, Forester and Coogan describe Collins as weeping bitterly on hearing of 
the death of Thomas Ashe through hunger-striking. Collins’ letters to Stack are 
utilised by most of the biographers. They are used in a way that shows his warmth 
towards the man in particular (considering the laters treatment of Collins later on) 
and of the imprisoned in general. It is interesting to note that from this period, we 
get from Breaslai a sense of intimacy both when concerning the atmosphere of the 
nationalist movement at the time and in his description of Collins’s character. His 
book is similar to Ryan’s in that it tends to focus more on the areas to which he is 
more personally associated. For example, Beaslai, in the second volume of his first 
work provides very little insight into the Treaty debates and that which is provided 
tends to come more from the Dublin perspective. He amends this to a certain extent 
in his later biography. On the other hand he spends a lot of time describing his own 
experience with prison escapes. In particular, he gives a lengthy description of the 
mass escape from Mountjoy prison in which he was involved, referring to it as ‘the 
famous daylight escape.’38 Beaslai through his work in propaganda and especially as 
editor of 'An tOglach’ enjoyed a close working relationship with Collins who made 
any contributions to the paper and describes him as the most energetic and efficient
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member of the outfit. ‘Of all the Directors none was so regular and punctual in his 
contributions as Collins who hardly ever missed an issue up to April, 1919, when 
the publication of the paper was temporally suspended owing to my 
imprisonment.’40 In this working environment, Collins’ face was ‘intensely mobile’ 
and could change instantly from a ‘broad grin’ to an expression of ‘scorn’ and just 
as suddenly would return to the ‘sunniest’ of expressions.4' Beaslai points out that 
he was one of Collins’ most frequent companions at this time.42 Beaslai’s own 
importance and significance at the time should not be overlooked, 'there are hints of 
this throughout his biographies on Collins. In his second biography the first hint we 
get of this concerns his notable position in the 1916 Rising and his position of power 
while interned. ‘All this time, most of the actual leaders of the 1916 Insurrection 
who had survived were still in prison. The senior surviving officers of the Dublin 
Brigade among the prisoners were in order of seniority, Eamon de Valera, Tom 
Ashe, Tom Hunter and myself .43
Therefore, his personal relationship with Collins and his own significant 
contributions to the same “cause” puts him in a position where he would be unlikely 
to blemish the character of Collins by describing what could be considered, to be 
certain negative traits.
Of all the biographers Beaslai and Coogan are the only two who express direct 
hostility towards de Valera. Coogan discusses the first recorded disagreement 
between Collins and de Valera not wanting Me Guinness to run for the bye-election.
De Valera’s two reasons for this were that, firstly, the nationalists should refuse to 
acknowledge the British Parliament and secondly, for fear of a reduction in the 
morale of the men of 1916 if the candidate was defeated. This gives Coogan an 
opportunity to invest de Valera’s character with hypocrisy by pointing out that he-
‘....  promptly forgot such argument later when a candidate himself.’ To this
Coogan responds that one of the ‘ enduring traits’ of de Valera’s career was his
‘.... ability to wrestle with his conscience and win.’44 From this point onwards, 
Coogan traces a growing divide between the two. This is highlighted by Collins not 
canvassing for de Valera’s by-election, which according to Coogan merits at least 
suspicion. De Valera sought control over Sinn Fein on the grounds that he had the
support of both the Volunteers and I.R.B. Griffith the founder of the movement
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graciously stepped down to facilitate de Valera’s wish. To this Coogan bitingly 
explains how- ‘Griffith wanted influence’, whilst ‘de Valera wanted power.’45 De 
Valera’s intransigence is expressed later on, when he refused to acknowledge 
Collins warning that the leaders of Sinn Fein ‘be arrested that night if they returned 
to familiar ground. He ‘...vacillated for a time but eventually did go home and was 
arrested in Greystones.’ In fact most of Sinn Fein were picked up.4^  Coogan gets 
very controversial when it comes to de Valera and his Lincoln prison escape. 
‘Curiously in his official biography, compiled at a time when, of course, both 
Collins and Boland were long dead, de Valera plays up the role of Boland and 
Brugha in organising it, and says it was Boland who broke the key in the lock. He 
does not refer at all to a far more important detail - the controversy over his decision 
to go to America immediately after his escape.’4?
Coogan quotes Beaslai’s second biography in saying that Cathal Brugha went to 
England and persuaded de Valera not to go straight to America but to return to 
Ireland and his people for a short visit. Coogan states that this conflicts with de 
Valera’s own version whereby the purpose of Brugha’s journey was to bring him up 
to date with the progress in establishing an Irish legislature. ‘De Valera would have 
us believe that it was subsequent to Brugha’s visit and his weighing up of the 
chances of getting a hearing at the Peace Conference in Paris that he began to think 
that the place in which he could best work for Ireland was the U.S.A. where he 
could bring pressure to bear on President Wilson.’48
Coogan points out how a few months earlier de Valera was supposedly lost without 
the company of his family. He is all the time suggesting a superficiality to de 
Valera’s truths and politics. He goes on to describe de Valera’s envy over Collins’ 
or the “Big Fella’s” increasing popularity.4?
His portrait of de Valera so far is one of a megalomaniac whose superficial morality 
and politics tow the line with the furtherance of his own personal prestige. There 
has to be a motive behind the depth of his negative analysis.
Beaslai is equally bitter towards de Valera’s character, if not more so. It is worth 
noting that Beaslai always refers to de Valera as Mr  He seems to reserve this
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formality for those whom he disapproves of. He introduces him in his second work 
by saying that when he returned to Ireland after his release from prison he was a 
political novice with no fixed views, and that it was only in Lewees jail that he firs 
began to study the Irish political situation. Accordingly his initial standpoint was 
that an Independent Republic was an unattainable ideal and consequently tended to 
focus more on “Dominion Home Rule” as a satisfactory compromise. Considering 
his later ardent Republicanism, Beaslai is underlying an ambiguity and looseness in 
his politics. Collins’s non-participation in de Valera’s East-Clare bye-election is put 
down to him having his ‘hands full.’so
A lack of clarity in de Valera’s thinking is suggested at when Beaslai refers to his 
refusal to heed Collins’ warning over the possible raid of the Sinn Fein leaders. ‘De 
Valera was reluctant to agree to this but in view of the strong representation made to 
him by other members he seemed inclined to consent to stay. At the conclusion of 
the meeting, however, he again announced his intention of returning home to 
Greystones.’51
It is in his earlier biography, however, that Breaslai is particularly cutting. Indeed a 
quite considerable proton of this "Michael Collins” biography is dedicated to 
reducing de Valera’s character. At the start of the second volume of this work, 
Beaslai claims that de Valera was the cause of the divide with Clan na nGael in 
America, and that twelve months after his return to Ireland he was again the cause of 
the split amongst the Irish nationalist ranks which resulted in Civil War. He points
out that when de Valera arrived in America in June 1919- ‘ he found there a
widespread, active and united organisation.’ but he ‘failed to “pull” with either John 
Devoy or Judge Cohalan’. He explains that some people complained that de Valera 
regarded public receptions in America as acknowledgements of his own personal 
worthiness rather than a platform from which to pursue the Irish nationalist cause. 
We learn that Collins and Griffith were told that there existed amongst the AmericanI
ranks a conspiracy motivated by jealousy to drive him back to Ireland. Trusting this, 
their loyalty for their leader didn’t swagger ‘to their cost’.
Beaslai goes on to say that only for de Valera’s obstinacy the Republican party under 
the Presidency of Harding would have in effect proclaimed the American recognition
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of Irish independence. But prior to the election de Valera wanted nothing from the 
Republicans unless they would campaign under a plank for full recognition of the 
Irish Republic and consequently received the former. Beaslai points out that, 
unfortunately the nationalists back in Ireland was detached from all this activity.
Though not selecting all the same activities from which to condemn de Valera, his 
portrayal of the man so far, is more or less the same as Coogan’s.52
O’ Broin, O’Connor and Forester are far less antagonistic in their appraisal of de 
Valera, at this stage.
O’Broin and O’Connor seem to deal with de Valera in the slightest possible way.
O’ Broin makes no critical commentary on his efforts in America. The one 
contribution he does make here, can be interpreted as a compliment. ‘The amount to 
be raised in the United States had been increased earlier from one and a quarter to 
five million dollars, a measure of the great success of one item of de Valera's 
American programme.’53 His only other input regafding de Valera concerns a 
conflict of opinion between himself and Collins. Collins’ approved of the 
Soleheadbeg shootings - the incident which is commonly considered to be the 
starting point of the Civil War - and the continuation of such violent means in order 
to achieve Irish Independence. O’ Broin comments that de Valera- ‘... on the other 
hand, spoke of subjecting the police forces to a policy of special ostracism’ .54
O’ Connor proves to be equally scanty on de Valera in this section. He says that 
after the rebellion the country was seeking a new leader. Eamon de Valera was the
choice and in him they- ‘....  had chosen unaware an extraordinary character,
perhaps the most extroadinary the revolution threw up.’53 Again no criticism, but 
this is quite understandable considering O’ Connors anti-treaty stance during the 
Civil War. This is the only significant references made to de Valera in the section, 
and not an uncomplimentary one. He obviously proves to be a very delicate topic of 
conversation, indeed.
Forester is slightly more substantial in her observation of the Irish leader. She 
begins by paying credit to his ability in unifying the various factions of Irish
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nationalism in Ireland after the rebellion. ‘He was not yet an elected leader; but it is 
significant that it was de Valera who was now able to draw the opposing factions 
together.’56 She states that de Valera’s plan was, firstly, to achieve Irish recognition 
of Irish Independence and then for a referendum to choose the type of government 
that would exist in the country. She points out that the inherent weakness in his 
formula, was that Britain was one of the leading country’s that had won the great 
war, and consequently she was on favourable terms in the international sphere.57
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She makes no mention of de Valera personally rejecting Collins’s warning not to 
return home on the night in which the leaders of Sinn Fein were arrested. She 
merely says that on- ‘...the night of Friday 17 May, Collins attended a meeting of 
the Sinn Fein Executive and gave warning of impending arrest to those on the list.’58 
Forester’s understanding of the rift in America is in stark contrast to that of 
Beaslai’s. She argues that he was in no way responsible for the rift. He is seen to 
be a passive entity caught up in the turbulent surroundings of a factioned Irish- 
American political scene.
‘There was thus, when de Valera came upon the American scene, an established, 
though as yet unrevealed rift in Irish-American ranks. It was a rift into which de 
Valera was unfortunately to be drawn. It had been remarked that this manifest ability 
to unite the different focus of Sinn Fein was entirely lacking in his American visit. 
The answer can only be that the American issues are resolved by Americans alone. 
De Valera was powerless to erase the dividing lines between Irish and American 
fields of interests, and his reliance on advisers partisan in what was, after all, an 
American quarrel aggravated differences which were not his to solve. His position, 
indeed, despite his protests was translated by his American public from that of 
President of Dail Eireann to President of the Irish Republic. De Valera’s own view 
was that he was in America solely to advance Irish interest. The resulting clashes 
undoubtedly arose largely through the failure of de Valera’s advisers to guide him on 
matters of American procedure of which they themselves may well have been
ignorant.’59
Her lack of hostility towards de Valera is further expressed when she says that the 
bond-certificate drive initiated by him in the states was an overwhelming success.60
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Her comparison between him and Collins was that they’re individual efforts towards 
Irish nationalism provided in a sense an essential partnership, for the country to
pursue its ambitions. ‘De Valera was th e  necessary personification of the
tricolour, Easter week, and the declaration of the Republic. Collins, was the more 
down to earth figure, the man who expounded no vision, devised no formula, but
got to work and saw that others did the same............ There are two kinds of leader:
one appeals to a nations idealism, the other to the individual’s everyday 
necessities.’61
Forester’s de Valera, in this section, is a very different man to the de Valera of 
Beaslai’s and Coogan’s telling. Here he is seen to be a unifying force, a man 
innocent of corrupt personal interests and considered a positive force for the 
betterment of Ireland’s situation.
The role of women in Irish nationalism is treated very scantily by the majority of 
biographers. Worst than this is the efforts made by Desmond Ryan, one of only 
three biographers who contribute one the issue. He places them in a negative light 
where they are seen to be detrimental to the cause of Irish freedom. His portrayal of 
women will be dealt with in a later section of the thesis, as he doesn’t comment on 
them, under the time period, presently under discussion.
Forester applauds the women as well as the men who worked diligently and bravely 
in Collins’ underground intelligence networks. She only really manages to refer to 
them in passing by, however.62 It is Coogan, who aware of its absence previously, 
stresses an acknowledgement qf their involvement. Nancy O’ Brien, Collins’ 
cousin, was- ‘... one of the unsung heroes of the time’. ‘Another vitally important 
agent.’ was Lily Merin. He goes on to emphasis that one ‘must take note of the 
Trojan work done by women’ and mentions several other key contributors. Coogan 
is perhaps helping to dispel on ideal of macho-heroism inate in early-twentieth 
century Irish nationalism.62
The conservative sensibilities prevent all but one of the biographers, Coogan, from 
discussing Collins’ relationships with women. Indeed Margery Forester goes as far 
as to say that he had little time for women. She does mention the Kiernan family
though she makes no particular reference to Kitty Kieman in this section. 64 Coogan 
mentions Collins’s initial interest in Helen Kiernan and how this was transferred to 
her sister Kitty. He suggests that Michael’s developing relationship with Kitty may 
have had a bearing on the subsequent decline in his friendship with Harry Boland, 
his best friend, who himself intended to marry her.65 He also unveils that Collins’s 
friendship with the Lewelyn Davis’s started a controversy based not only on politics 
but also on sex.66
Collins’s capacity for being impatient, cruel and ruthless with his fellow workers 
and with those whom he was fighting against is avoided here in this section by 
Beaslai and O’ Connor. Forester, is willing to highlight his darker side. She tells us 
that not all were impressed by him. Robert Brennan, for example, considered him to 
be both ruthless with friend and foe and incapable of accepting criticism or 
opposition. However, he goes on to say that while he drove everyone hard he droveI
no one harder than himself. Again, W.T. Cosgrave initially disapproved of his 
“brusqueness of manner” but later came to be impressed by his personality and 
ability. She also argues that his reputation for interfering in other peoples work 
should not be overemphasised.67 She justifies the fact that he bullied and hectored 
those under his control because they- ‘... also learnt that he had asked nothing of 
them that he would not do himself. If Collins gave no vicarious thanks he wasted no 
time in blame.’68 Coogans treatment of Collins’ darker side is similar to Foresters: 
He highlights Collins’s cruelty, impatience and ruthlessness but then tries to justify 
them. For example he provides anecdotes concerning his behaviour towards his 
cousin Nancy O’ Brien and his close confident, Joe O’ Reilly. He manages to 
balance Collins’ harshness with a more amenable quality in all of these anecdotes.169
O’ Broin and Ryan on the other hand, don’t find it necessary to justify every flaw 
they find in Collins.
An example of this comes from O’ Broin when discussing a riot that resulted from 
victory celebrations of the Great War. ‘Collins displayed a callous streak when he 
told Stack of 125 wounded soldiers who had been treated in the hospitals.
“Before morning three soldiers and an officer had ceased to need any attention and 
one died the following day. A policeman, too, was in a very precarious condition
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to a few days ago when I ceased to take any further interest in him. He was unlikely 
to recover.’” Ryan quotes Collins giving out to one of his commandants for being 
late. ‘ “Ten minutes late, you louser! Go away and come back in six hours and ten 
minutes. Don’t think because ypu are a commandant you can walk over me and 
time. Get out, and quick!” Grinning pathetically, the Commandant withdrew. Mick 
spluttered and muttered to himself. ’ 71 Ryan claims that Collins knew himself that he 
was a hard and exacting taskmaster and that he was a difficult man to work with in 
some moods.72
During this section, Beaslai, Coogan, and Forester comment on the rights and 
wrongs of Collins and his pursuit of independence through violent means.
Beaslai claims that the Volunteers held out from committing violence for as long as 
possible, against all types of provocation from the British system.73i He praises 
Collins’s hit “squad” with callous disregard for its victims- ‘To the courage, loyalty 
and secrecy of the members of this small body was due the success of many of the 
operations in Dublin, which wrought such damage on the English machinery of 
coercion and oppression.’74 He reminds us that citizens were subjected to ‘daily 
outrages’ both in their house and on the streets.75 He goes on to say that even the
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meetings of a ‘non-political’ commission of Inquiry into Irish Industries were 
prohibited.76 It is a flexible interpretation to consider such a commission as being 
totally ‘non-political’, especially considering the political context of the time. He 
justifies violence by going on to say th a t:- ‘The reader must bear these facts in mind 
in order to visualise the atmosphere in which a constructive national movement was 
transferred into a guerrilla warfare, and energies that should have been devoted to the 
industrial, social and cultural advancement of the country were diverted into the 
destructive work of the bomb and the bullet.’77
Forester rests the responsibility for all the bloodshed in Ireland at the time, at the feet 
of the British administration. ‘Britain’s inability to accept that though the Act of 
Union remained unrepealed this separation was a fact and not merely a threat, 
accounts for the period of bloodshed and bitterness that followed. The vast majority 
of Irish people were by no means dedicated Republicans, but because it was the 
party of resolute opposition to British domination.’7» She goes on to make a
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hyperbolic comparison between Collins’s fighting force and the “Wild Geese” 
whose military accomplishments she elevates to an almost mythological degree. She 
says that Collins’ I.R.A. were the stock of these wild geese who were amongst the 
finest mercenaries the world had ever known. She points out that this fighting race 
had not been diluted through time. It had prevailed more recently at Flanders and 
Suvla Bay. It is, therefore, no surprise that this wonderful military ‘heritage’, once 
adapted to the methods of guerrilla warfare, should destroy Britain’s grip over 
Ireland.79
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She avoids going into detail of the squad’s assassination. Instead she stresses how 
meticulously Collins treats the whole area of assassination, despite the provocation.
‘There was no elation for Collins in his killing, though the “G” man had been a 
particularly injurious thorn in the nationalist flesh for years. No member of the 
squad was ever under any circumstance, permitted to shoot even a known spy 
without authority, except in self-defence.’80
While Coogan applauds the work of Collins’ military forces, he is willing to provide 
a more realistic and over-all impression of why Collins was successful. Unlike 
Forester, with her island of formidable warriors theory, Coogan’s less dramatic 
explanation is that Collins and his network were able to destroy the British system 
in Ireland because it was far less secure than it seemed.81
Unlike Forester, Coogan does manage to go into the detail of the assassinations. 
The first man assassinated by Collins’ squad was the “G” man the “Dog” Smith, 
whom Coogan goes as far as to call a courageous man. Another of the “G” men 
assassinated was Hoey, whom Coogan refers to as a deeply religious man. He 
manages to accept the obvious ruthlessness of the killings but balances this by 
stressing that the assassinations were carried out under strict instructions whereby no 
one was to be shot except under orders or in cases of self-defence. He justifies this 
with several examples.82
We are given quite a few glimpses into Desmond Ryan’s Hogan in his pursuit of 
Collins, before he comes to be shot. Overall he is painted as an unsavoury character
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and therefore, his assassination is somewhat justified. “A bad egg, that fellow! He 
would give his own father and mother up. Hadn’t he pointed out Sean MacDermott 
and many another since? Blackguarding decent folk. Called himself an Irishman.”83
All of the above biographers approve of the Squad and its method but some are more 
willing to discuss their activities than others. This is where Coogan, in particular 
stands out. Though Coogan maybe a very biast biographer, he provides a wealth of 
information from divergent sources which allow for a more authentic impression, 
despite his use of these sources to make an argument which supports his views.
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THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
The assignation of informers or “touts”, a secret service men and spies, by Collins 
and his network, is justified as being deemed necessary by most of the biographers.
Beaslai begins by reducing the character of these so called “touts”. They are the 
unsavoury element of society, the- ‘local beggars, loafers and petty criminals.’ But 
while this ‘ignorant and degraded type’ were the informers, some of the secret 
service men were men of energy and great skill. Collins was able to battle this well- 
funded secret service because of the efficiency of his network, the loyalty of the 
people and the solidarity of Sinn Fein.84 The assassination of spies is justified
because they- ‘ were not only spies, subject to the penalties of spies of war,
but had all directly or indirectly been concerned in the murder of Irish Citizens.’85 
Beaslai refers to the assassination of a female informer. This assassination was not 
sanctioned by G.H.Q. but according to Beaslai it was fully justified. He manages to
regret however that ‘ the action was taken under circumstances that savoured of
irregularity and that the full facts were not made public at the time.’ 86 Of course, this 
was, by far, not the only unsanctioned assassination of the time, nor the only one 
highlighted by Beaslai, but because of a certain conservative and by-the-book 
morality, the killing of a woman is more of a crime than the killing of a man. Yet at 
least Beaslai manages to show regret at this instance. Even more regrettable, from 
Beaslai’s point of view, was the execution of Major Campton-Smith who was a -
’....  man of amiable and estimable character, who had done nothing unworthy
against us’. However, his death is seen not to be the responsibility of the
Volunteers but of the British forces. He had to- ‘ suffer for the atrocities of
“the forces of the crown’” . He was held as a hostage for the ‘Clonmult prisoners’. 
To further create the balance, Beaslai goes on to discuss the foul treatment of these 
Clonmult Volunteers We also learn that Collins tried to intervene into the case of 
Major Compton-Smith but was too late. Beaslai refers to another ‘amiable victim’ of 
the ‘times’, District Inspector Potter. His life was offered for Thomas Traynor, a 
Dublin Volunteer, but this offer was ignored. Therefore, he too was executed and 
the responsibility is again shifted. It was not the responsibility of the Volunteers but 
rather a consequence of the ‘times’.87 A general Lucas was kept a captivity by the 
Volunteers for a while. Beaslai highlights how he gave a ‘very favourable account’
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of his captors, and how one volunteer officer, in particular, was one of the most 
perfect gentlemen he had ever met”.88 Beaslai’s Volunteer is more of a perfect host 
than an assassin or executioner.
Like Beaslai, O’Connor justifies the assassination of spies by reducing their 
character. The spy, Quinslick is a ‘vain man’. His behaviour is seen to be an 
interesting example of ‘the informer’s type of mind, a mind which ultimately 
deceives only itself’. O’ Connor goes as far as to say that ‘the analogy of insanity is 
so close that it cannot be overlooked’. It is a mind ‘entirely obscured by its own 
capacity for self-deception’. O’ Connor is promoting a sense of apathy towards this 
character. By the time the reader learns of his assassination he is a ‘pathetic figure’ 
with ‘his grievance, his treachery, his furk, his loquacity and his conceit’. The book 
implies that Collins could have dealt with him much e a r l ie r .8 9
Jameson, another spy, is seen to have been given excessive chances by Collins. 
However the same spy mentality probed Jameson to continue his pursuits against 
those who would rather not harm him. ‘Anyone but a thorough going spy would 
have been glad to get out of trouble as easily as this, and thanked heaven for a group 
of soft-hearthed young men with no great taste for bloodshed. But your spy is a 
conceited fellow.’90
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Fergus Brian Molloy, another spy, is again depersonified to fit into O’ Connor’s 
categorisation. He ‘suffered from the usual weakness of spies’, and pressed for 
genuine information. O’ Connor points out that Molloy wasn’t going to get the same 
chance as those spies previous to him, as Jameson had made Collins more cautious. 
Collins decided in a short space of time that Molloy must be gotten rid of Cullen, one 
of Collins’ right hand men objected to this on the grounds that Jameson had received
to many chances. This shows Collins’ darker side and how ‘ the shadow of the
terror h a d  fallen on [him]’. However, this is put down to ‘realistic spirit’. In
Molloy’s assassination, the squad had to fight off crowds of people in their escape. 
Here, he compares the realistic spirit of the Volunteers with the spirit of the people 
or the Lilliputians as he may well perceive them. ‘How far the realistic spirit of the 
Volunteers outraced that of the people was shown by a massed attack upon the 
Squad, who had to beat their way out with drawn guns.’91
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He goes into quite considerable detail of the assassination of spies. I believe he goes 
into such detail, because he feels he must convince the reader, that these people, who 
were not military men, deserved to die as if they were and that the calibre of their 
character justifies this. He concludes by stressing that the- ‘...shooting of spies 
occupied much less of Collins’s time than [his account] might suggest*.^
The National Loan funds were being traced by an Inspector Bell. It is here, that O’ 
Connor shows Collins’ ruthless sense of reality at its most extreme. ‘It was now 
only a question of time until he laid hands upon the National Loan. Collins had 
collected that money; and it was not in the least likely that he would allow even the 
most excellent father of a family to get away with it. With less compunction than he 
had ever shown, he sent the intelligence officers to get Mr. Bell.’ Beaslai could 
never be expected to reveal so much information in such a manner.93
Coogan is less harsh in his appraisal of the spy. For example, he tells the reader that 
Jameson died bravely for his King. His main angle on the Jameson incident is that it
gives ‘ another glimpse of Collins’ extraordinary network of agents. The story
shows that Collins had penetrated right into the heart of the British Secret 
Service.’94
He stresses that Collins took no pleasure in killing and states that there are well- 
documentated stories that convey the ‘tension and horror’ that gripped him prior to 
an assassination. Again, it is the realities of the situation that justifies his actions.
‘ with his knowledge of the castle regime he realised that one spy was more
dangerous to him than a regiment of soldiers.’95
Coogan points out, that in theory, the shooting of spies was supposed to be. 
authorised by G.H.Q. In particular, it was Cathal Brugha, who wanted this rule to 
be stringently followed, so as to be able to please a possible international 
commission, at a future date. But Coogan says that in Cork the Volunteers were 
being ‘hunted from pillar to post’.
Coogan uses a source here that claims Collins’ response to a query regarding the
unauthorised shooting of spies in the Cork area was ‘ shoot... and say nothing
about it’ .96
Coogan is similar to Beaslai and O’ Connor in the way he justifies by condemnation
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the assassination of informers. ‘The calibre of these wretches may be gauged from 
the fact that one was a man found drunk in a ditch by Volunteers. Befuddled by the 
spoils of his blood money he babbled on to them after being woken up, in the belief 
that they were British soldiers, until he realised too late, that he was talking himself 
into another, longer, sleep.’97
Coogan admits that one of the ‘most tragic aspects’ of the War of Independence was 
the executions of good men from both sides. By using Compton-Smith as an 
example of this, he also manages to show the chivalry of the Irish Volunteers 
compared with that of the British forces. He quotes him in his last letter to his wife,
saying that their treatment of him was- ‘ far better than Englishmen would treat
an Irishman in the same circumstances’.
Again, it was the reality of the situation that ‘militated against kindly feeling’.98 
He is more revealing than Beaslai, when he comments on Collins’ supposed 
opposition to the shooting of women. In the example which he uses below, he also 
shows his close family ties to the nationalist movement at the time. ‘This does not 
appear to have been his attitude always, to judge from a story concerning my father. 
According to this, he and another Volunteer were sent out by Collins to shoot two 
young women who had been consorting with British soldiers and had apparently 
given away information.’ However, his father realised that the girls were ‘very 
young and beautiful’ and couldn’t go ahead with the shooting. Coogan says that for 
once Collins wasn’t disappointed with the poor result’.99 This is a good example of 
how Coogan despite his strong views, is willing to provide a more wholesome 
picture of what's going on, than are most of the biographers under discussion.
Ryán, in his almost Joycian style, throws all classes of spy and informer into the 
same bracket, and disparages them equally. ‘Spies everywhere, from the semi­
derelict hawker to the jolly commercial traveller spouting treason and revolution to
Michael Collins’ own agents ’ioo Hemp is his example of a spy and he regrets
that there were ‘derelicts’ like him in the world. 101 He reflects on the more 
admirable members of the British forces and regrets their executions, but manages to 
show how the Irish method of justice was better than the British system. He regrets
that Captain Bradford was dead, he who ‘ sent the IRA to his Majesty’s
prisons without heat or venom, who thought trial by court martial a fairer tribunal 
than his Majesty’s courts ’ 102 He is also willing to admit that Collins
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‘ and the small band behind the guerrilla war hadn’t much sentiment.... As
little sentiment as their foes Blow for blow ’ 103
O’ Br'oin discusses several of the spies and their activities but never slant their 
character. He merely says that neither Quinslick nor Molloy were top quality agents 
but that Jameson deserved to be regarded as one. His only criticism of Jameson is 
through the words and impressions of others. Tom Cullen considered him to be a 
‘crooked English bastard’ and Mrs. Batt O’Connor was alarmed when she saw his 
physical appearance.104
Forester doesn’t provide much analysis when it comes to this area. According to 
Forester Mr. Bell’s assassination is deemed necessary, the reality being that the
National Loan was at stake. ‘........ Collins scowled. This was money, most of
it, from the poor of the land, entrusted to him so that he could carry out the promise
of a better deal for them in the future His scowl boded ill for Mr. Bell..’105
In reference to an informer who frequented Vaughans Hotel, Forester quotes Collins 
as saying- ‘We’ll do nothing. We know about him. We don’t want anything 
m e ssy .’ 100 This suggests awareness of negative publicity but also a sense of 
fairplay.
The amount of information provided on the assassinations of the British Secret 
Service that occurred on the morning of what is commonly referred to as Bloody 
Sunday varies from biography to biography. Forester is willing to point out that 
there were ‘three or four tragic errors of identity’ and that several of the intended 
targets escaped. But she immediately balances this by stating that some of the 
Volunteers who took part in this ‘nerve-shattering work’ would never fully recover, 
mentally from the ordeal, and by claiming that the assassinations were a noble affair. 
What motivate such a grave undertaking? The simple answer was ‘Irish freedom’. 
Somewhat predictably she concludes that Collins ‘was no less shaken than those 
who had acted on his orders.’102 She goes on to describe the retributive and barbaric 
incident in Croke Park - where the Auxiliaries fired into the gathered crowd killing 
indiscriminately - in a much less reserved fashion.108
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Me Kee, Clancy and Clune who had been picked up and interned the previous 
evening also lost their lives due to the retributive reactions of the British forces.
To make matters worse Clune was innocent of nationalist activities. A report 
claimed that the three were killed in an escape attempt. To this Margary Forester say- 
Tt is not inconceivable that the three had made a desperate bid for freedom, or at 
least for a swift death. From what they had attempted to escape will probably never 
be known.’ We learn that Collins ‘overrode all protests’ and helped dress the dead 
bodies in Volunteers uniform and helped carry their coffins. For days ‘he appeared 
to care nothing for anything at all, but moved recklessly about Dublin’. True 
humanity is seen to exist only on the Irish side of the fence. 1Q9 
Forester is never more determined to justify extreme nationalism than is Piaras 
Beaslai. His detail on the Bloody Sunday assassinations is slight. The errors of 
identify are not referred to nor is the atmosphere of the occasion expressed. He 
merely describes the event as a concrete fact. ‘On the morning of November 21st, 
parties of Volunteers raided houses in various parts of Dublin and fourteen English 
officers were shot dead.’110 The idea that Me Kee, Clancy and Clune were shot 
whilst attempting to escape is seen to be a ‘romantic account’ stemming from the 
‘provider of Castle fairy [sic] tails.’ Beaslai had been in the company of the three 
men, the night that they were arrested, which again gives an auto-biographical sense 
to this work. He focuses more on this episode than on the Croke Park massacre. 
When referring to ‘poor Clune’ he says that - ‘Of course [he] would not mention 
having been in the company of Sean O’ Connell or me.’ i > i
O’Connor justifies the Bloody Sunday assassinations as being a logical necessity. 
‘It was becoming obvious if Ireland did not have her Bloody Sunday, England 
would have hers.’ 112 However O’Connor is not afraid to be visually graphic in his 
description and manages to provide one of the assassinated British officers with a 
sentimental association- ‘....a young head fell back upon the pillow and a red streak 
spread about it. The portrait of a girl continued to smile from the dressing table’. 
He goes into very little detail over the Croke Park incident, but instead, focuses on 
the murders of Me Kee, Clancy and Clune and on Collins’ reaction to this.' >3
Coogan’s justification for the assassinations is the same as O’ Connors; the ‘Cairo 
Gang’ were getting closer to Collins. Coogan shows that it was a difficult
undertaking for Collins to pursue. In the evening prior to Bloody Sunday he 
‘happened to speculate as to what sort of men they were whom he had consigned to 
doom the next day’.
Coogan doesn't conceal the reality of what happened that morning. He point out that 
some of the agents shot were in the presence of their wives. He admits that some of
the assassins didn’t hesitate in their duty. ‘O Hanlon  recalled that one of the
victims, an old major, had a meal prepared. “Mick White ate the breakfast.” Joe 
Boland was so disgusted at finding that one prime target, Major King, a colleague of 
Hardy, was missing when he burst into his room, that he took revenge by giving his 
half-naked mistress “a right scourging with a sword scabbard”, and setting fire to the 
room afterwards.’ However, in classical Coogan fashion, while he manages to be
I
objective in his use of the facts, he directs these facts towards a conclusion that 
justifies the progression of nationalism through a medium of violence. As a prequel
to the above quotation he claims that the ‘ killers were all young men, generally
of religious sensibility, and most of them didn’t find their work easy’. Just after the 
quotation he uses the words of Charles Dalton to sum up the general spirit of the
morning - ‘ I thought over our mornings work and offered up a prayer for the
fallen.’ Collins was ‘white and defiant with no expression of pleasure’ as O’ Reilly 
reported the results to him. 114 Coogan goes on to describe the horrors of Croke 
Park, and the shooting of Me Kee, Clancy and Clune. Coogan points out that even 
‘the bravest of men thought [Collins] was mad’ to attend the dead bodies. In 
response to the British behaviour and propaganda that surrounded Bloody Sunday, 
Coogan wondered how much the British government were kept informed by the
military, us
Leon O’ Broin is the most critical of Collins’ and his network participation in the 
events of Bloody Sunday. He doesn’t try to humanise their undertaking by 
commenting on how it affected the assassins or Collins personally Nor does he 
personally justify it as being necessary, but rather states that Collins considered it 
necessary. It was Collins who ‘excused’ it, ‘cold-blooded though it was’.
‘ fifteen British officers were shot dead in their Dublin bedroom, some of them
in the presence of their,wifes. The operation was intended to dispose of secret 
service personnal only, but names were added by the Dublin Brigade to the list 
prepared by Collins’s intelligence group, and these turned out to be ordinary
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officers of the regular army. This suggested that the functioning of Collins’s
I
intelligence system was far from faultless; but the bulk of those put to death were 
members of a “Cairo Gang”  and Collins excused the whole operation, cold­
blooded though it was, by saying that he had to get his blow in first, otherwise he 
and his men would have been put on the spot.’116 He describes Croke Park and the 
killing of Me Kee, Clancy and Clune in a candid fashion.' 12
Beaslai goes into greater detail than any of the other biographers, when it comes to 
describing the atrocities committed by the British forces in Ireland during the War of 
Independence. He also takes great delight in discussing the consequent cover-ups 
that were administered by the higher echelons of the Military and by the general 
Government policy regarding Ireland at the time.
He describes the horrors committed by the Black and Tans (or alternatively the 
‘drink-maddened savages’) and only partially classes them apart from the 
supposedly more professional Auxiliary forces.118 He accepts that a considerable 
portion of the Auxiliary forces were ‘ex-officers’ but claims that ‘the criminal 
element was also found amongst them’. Whilst there were ‘as fine types’ there were 
also a ‘great many very low scoundrels’. 119 He attacks the character of these men 
where ever possible. For example, he claims that during the daily hold-ups and 
searches in Dublin ‘ the military usually behaved with courtesy and forbearance’ but 
the Auxiliaries ‘often insulted or struck civilians’ and that sometimes ‘these “ex­
officers” robbed men of money and other property’. He adds to this that thefts ‘both 
by Auxiliaries and soldiers were also a common feature of the nightly raids on 
house’.120
Beaslai personifies his detestation of the British Government in the form of Sir 
Hamer Greenwood, whom accordingly tended to lie ‘with airy imperturbility.’121 
With ‘characteristic audacity’ Greenwood suggested that the British reprisals were 
not the work of the Crown Forces. He discusses in great detail the implausibility of 
Greenwood’s statement which claimed that there was no evidence that the burning of 
Cork city was started by the Crown Forces.122 He finishes here, by broadening his 
attack, so as to include the general level of thinking behind the British parliaments, 
‘..any lie was good enough for Greenwood’s hearers.’ He also shows Macready in 
a negative light when it came to the burning of Cork city’.123
The British Government’s decision to form the Orangemen into an armed force
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called the ‘Special Constabulary’ was according to Beaslai even more atrocious than 
the creation of the Black and Tans. Beaslai’s denigration of the Orangemen could 
hardly be called subtle. ‘Men inspired with a bigoted hatred of their catholic 
neighbours, men who had continually used violence against them, were now 
officially armed and placed in a position of authority over them, with unlimited 
power of persecution. ’ 124 Here Beaslai is extending his style of justifying the 
nationalist cause through reduction of the enemy’s character, by categorising all 
Orangemen with the same brush, and lumping their negative traits together with 
those of the British administration.
Leon O’ Broin is able to show the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries up, and yet 
refrains from being excessive and manages to maintain his objectivity. For example, 
he is willing to condemn them from the British perspective. ‘Their function was to 
provide a counter to terrorism, but Macready saw them from the very beginning as a 
pack of cut-throats who were as much an obstacle to the pacification of the country 
as the Volunteers were. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshall Sir 
Henry Wilson a g r e e d ...’ 125 Unlike Beaslai who merely condemns British savagery, 
O’ Broin attempts to give an insight into the rationale of British government. For 
example, he offers a profile of Lloyd George’s mentality, whom according to O’ 
Broin ‘..was unwilling ever to admit that a rebellion existed which had to be 
countered by military m e t h o d s . ’ 126
Margery Forester shows a certain degree of sympathy to some of the prominent 
members of the the British administration at the time. From a military point of view, 
she' says that from the appointment of General Sir Neval Macready as Commander-
in-chief of the British forces in Ireland it was- ‘ to his credit that, ......., the
military forces earned a reputation among the Irish for strict soldierly conduct, 
despite the disheartenment of what the troops themselves felt to be lack of 
Government support.’ >27 As can be seen, she is able to do this while still managing 
to rebuke the Government. She even makes an effort to defend Sir Hamar 
Greenwood. ‘Sir Hamar was to become probably the most hated man on the Irish 
scene. It was clear that Sir Hamar, a Canadian, had no personal vindictiveness for 
the Southern Irish. He had accepted his job and did it without fear or favour if with 
a certain self-righteousness.’ >28
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Forester dismisses the old myth that the Black and Tans were of the convict classes 
buts does so without elevating their position. T he Irish belief that the prisons had
been opened to provide recruits to the Black and Tans  is undoubtedly
unfounded; it is also undoubtedly true that large numbers of those accepted lost little 
time, once in Ireland, in qualifying for prison terms.’129 She says that the British 
Army, by and large behaved in a ‘civilized fashion’. But she balances this view with
further criticism of the Black and Tans- ‘ whose awfulness fully compensated the
Army’s restraint in the scales upon which nations weigh each other’. She claims that 
the I.R.A. by contrast were a highly disciplined force.>30 Her feelings towards the 
Auxiliaries are mixed ones. She says that they were generally better behaved than 
the Black and Tans but that this depended on the local commanders. She points out 
that they were a tougher force and consequently capable of a higher degree of 
‘organised hell-making’.^ 1 Like O’ Broin she claims that the British Government 
refused to admit that a state of war existed in I r e la n d . 122
Coogan views the situation differently. He doesn’t see the country as having been in 
a complete state of war at the time. ‘What in fact happened was that the British 
position was so untenable morally that they could not use their Army properly and 
were never able to put forth their full military might.’ ]33 Coogan goes into quite 
considerable detail, in discussing the police and military atrocities of the time. But 
like Forester, he dismisses the old view that the Black and Tans came from the 
British prisons but claims that they were encouraged to behave as if they did, and 
thereby making the country- ‘a most inappropriate hell for an entire population’.134 
To describe the Auxiliaries he quotes Frank O’ Connor (This description can be 
found earlier in this text) >35 Coogan resorts to a long critique of both the Black and 
Tans and the Auxiliaries.
Coogan is panoramic in his scope of detail. He provides the British perspective and 
how the Governments reprisal policy spread outrage across England resulting in 
debate in the House of Commons where a censure motion was put down. The 
reprisals continued and a policy of attacking and destroying local industry ensued. 
He uses this background to fuel his argument that British behaviour in Ireland at the 
time was barbaric and psychotic.'36
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He strongly criticises Hamar Greenwood and is less than amicable in his description 
of Lloyd George who made speeches at Caernarvon, 9th October [1920] and at 
the Guildhall Banquet, 9th November [1920] which clearly backed the policy of 
reprisal and hanging’. 137 He blames the leading members of Government of being 
aware of the reprisals in Ireland and of being personally involved in covering them 
up and allocating the blame on the extreme nationalists. When referring to the 
authorised burning of creameries, bacon factories and mills by the British forces he
says that policy- ‘ calmly formulated in public school accents behind closed
doors can manifest itself in very raucous and savage proceedings when translated 
into action.’138
Frank O’ Connor gives a balanced account of the Auxiliaries. ‘In a curious way the
Irish, who like a good fighter respected them the Volunteers1 testified to their
bravery, but too often the mangled corpses of a woman or an old man did as much 
for their savagery.’ >39
O’ Connor expresses a strong dislike for Lloyd George and associates him directly 
with a lot of the evils of the War of Independence. The English were losing their 
barracks in Ireland, and according to O’ Connor, Lloyd George’s remedy for this
was to draw- ‘ upon the bravo’s, the bullies, ex-convicts and ne’er do-wells to
maintain the peace ’ 1411 He is referring here, to the Black and Tans. He highlights
Lloyd George’s capacity for deception. An example of this being that he declared 
the murder of MacCurtain to have been the work of the Sinn Fein extremists. Earlier 
on in the biography, he points out that Lloyd George had instructed Lord French to 
give the rebels hell in his attempt to impose conscription. Lloyd George appears to 
be O’ Connor’s primary target, just as Sir Hamar Greenwood was central to 
Beaslai’s criticism.141
Like Coogan, O’ Connor admits that a full state of war did not exist in the country 
and that it was more a fight between two secret services.
As the British are condemned for their violence the Irish are often, conversely, 
applauded for theirs. Beaslai glorifies the Volunteers in their fight against the Crown 
Forces and criticises the more passive members of the Irish population. He points 
out that the counties which were more active in the War of Independence didn’t
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suffer as much as those influenced by the ‘timid counsels of pacifists’, and that it 
was a ‘remarkable phenomenon’ how some of the more peaceful areas became 
aggressively warlike after the Treaty was signed. >48 He says that Kevin Barry met 
his execution ‘with a bravery worthy of the records of the Volunteers’. 146 In  
typically hyperbolic style he says of the flying columns:- ‘Surely in all the history of 
warfare there was never a more prolonged and successful struggle by a handful of 
men against such odds.’ He tells us that they were received everywhere and this 
was evidence of popular support, w
Beaslai, generally tries to avoid commenting on the more brutal behaviour of the 
Irish side. However, it would be impossible for him to always avoid it, and when it 
is dealt with it is always justified out of necessity and the responsibility is focused on 
the British. When it came to whether Collins’ men should attack lorries carrying 
British forces through the streets of Dublin, a dilemma arose, because the civilian 
population would be endangered. According to Beaslai, however, the intensified 
pressure of the British forces in Dublin, ‘forced’ the decision to commence with the 
attacks.
In the following extract Beaslai shifts the responsibility when he says that the Crown 
Forces were operating ‘under the cover of the civilian population’. ‘It had to be 
recognised that the enemy was operating against us daily under the cover of the 
civilian population, and, as long as they could operate against us in drmed parties 
with entire impunity in Dublin, our situation would grow more and more difficult. 
Attacks on lorries of soldiers, and Black and Tans, with bombs and revolvers, was 
now resorted to and became a daily occurrence.’148
The real Volunteers enjoyed moral purity - at least in Beaslai’s mind where truth 
wasn’t a primary concern - unlike the British forces or later the anti-treatyites in the 
Civil War. ‘I may remark in passing that all our messangers were men or youths. I 
wish to emphasis this point, in view of the use of women and little girls in later 
warfare against the Free State Army.’149
Beaslai argues throughout this section of his biography that the harsh conditions 
enforced by the British in this country made the ‘virile’ element of the Irish mind
inevitably violent in its nature whereby- ‘ none could think save in terms of
destruction, of bullets, bombs and burning’.*50 Not only the virile were affected but 
also persons- ‘who a year ago were not Sinn Feiners, persons who a year ago had
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depreciated “acts of violence”, were now delighted to hear of fresh attacks on the 
Black and Tans.’151
Beaslai is unintentionally revealing in certain places in this section. An example of 
this is when he states that the home addresses of a number of Black and Tans were 
ascertained, raided and burned.152 It is obvious that he is saying this to satisfy the 
reader’s desire for revenge. He takes great pains to stress how barbaric it was for 
the Black and Tans to attack Irish families and yet fails to apply the same logic here- 
This is an example of how the nationalist writings in these biographies can lose their 
strand of logic.
O’ Connor is less willing to praise the Irish people as an entity than is Beaslai. He 
says that the threat of conscription was the main catalyst in turning the Volunteers 
from a political minority into what he termed a ‘national army’.153 He goes on to say 
that once the threat of conscription lapsed, thousands of the ‘raw recruits’ who had ‘ 
no intense desire’ to fight the English went back to civilian life. Of the Dail 
government, he was willing to admit that many of the departments never 
funcitionised. He reflects negatively on the Ireland that the War of Independence
was leaving behind, the- ‘ Holy Ireland with its flamboyant romanticism and
query conscience was rapidly going under.’154
He admits that Collins’ forces became increasingly violent. This is again seen as 
being necessary to deal with the increase in savagery on the British side. Regarding 
the battle between Collins’ intelligence system and the British secret service he is
willing to admit that both sides ‘.........  fought   without mercy in the
darkness’.155
Again unlike Coogan or O’ Connor, Forester veers towards the old view that the 
country was truly at war during the War of Independence.15^
Like Beaslai, Forester claims that the violent reaction of certain members of the Irish 
population to British behaviour in this country was an inevitable response. They 
don’t elaborate to consider that a certain percentage of people out of any population 
are less resistant to the call of violence than the rest. However, Forester is quite 
honest in her description of the behaviour of those who resorted to violence. ‘Most 
of them were chivalrous and high-minded. A few showed a callous indifference to 
life that was almost mediaeval in its peasant fatalism f Violence begets violence and
38
undoubtedly, by the end, deeds were done in cold blood that would scarcely have 
been contemplated in the hot anger of personal conscience in the first days of taking 
up arms.’157 She is also willing to admit that civilians often got caught up, helplessly 
between the two sides.
Forester’s committed respect for the Irish fighter is blatantly expressed throughout 
the course of her biography. An example of this can be found in her comments on 
Treacy, whom she considers to personify the ‘ideal volunteer’. ‘Swift upon the 
trigger, indifferent to danger, untouched by hatred, he neither romanticised war nor 
treated it cynically, but fought a clean, hard fight.’ This respect for the Irish fighter, 
is a common trait amongst all the biographers and tends to motivate their arguments 
though to different extents. For example, Forester in her referring to the Kilmichael 
ambush - whereby eighteen Auxiliaries were killed - says that Collins ‘rejoiced, gay 
as a schoolboy’. The Volunteers who carried out the ambush were from Cork, his 
home county- ‘proving to Britain that Ireland was not beaten yet, not by a long 
chalk’. 158 She doesn’t find it disturbing that Collins rejoiced at this. In fact she 
herself seems to be rejoicing with him.
O’ Broin is the least hot-blooded here, and his arguments are the most open-minded. 
He analyizes the War of Independence technically and his honest style is almost 
beyond reproach. He refrains from glorifying the Irish as he does from discrediting 
the British. Whereby the explanations of volunteer success coming from certain of 
the other biographers rely on their emotive quality, his, depend only on rationale. 
‘On the Sinn Fein side the exponents of physical force worked as a team under 
single direction, whereas on the government side there was little evidence of co­
operation between the civil authorities, the police and the military.’ 159 
While he admires the efficiency of Collins’ intelligence network, he is also willing to 
criticise it where necessary.
‘ it is evident from a scathing criticism from G.H.Q. in March 1921 that the
I.R.A. in rural areas, had, generally speaking, a very faulty grasp of the nature and 
techniques of intelligence work. On the other hand, under Brigadier - General 
Ormonde Winter, British Intelligence, long defective, had improved significantly.’ 160 
He doesn’t provide a broad, detailed account like Coogan, though nor does he have 
the latter’s constant need for justification.
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Of all the biographers, Coogan is most informative when it comes to detailing the 
Irish side of the fight during the War of Independence. But as always everything is 
justified. He tells the reader that Oscar Traynor told Ernie O’ Malley that he became 
particularly upset when a woman, the mother of three children, was accidentally 
killed in crossfire while she was shopping. However, we are told that this was a
rarity and, indeed, that it was- ‘ a miracle of either luck or markmanship on
both sides that civilian casualties were not far higher’. Coogan, therefore, manages 
to turn it around from a negative into an almost positive comment. *61 
He quotes Mary Collins-Powell saying that she heard one afternoon, that six British 
soldiers had been shot in various parts of Cork city and that some of them were 
‘mere children’. However immediately after providing this information he 
personalises it with the difficulties that Collins was enduring. ‘While these tragedies 
were occurring in the foregound of Collins’ life, in the background he had to 
contend with a vendetta that Brugha conducted against him and which de Valera 
literally presided over. It was so intense that it caused him to think seriously about 
quitting his highly successful underground war in Dublin and taking to the hills with 
the Cork I . R . A . ’ *62 He is therefore associating the fatal situation of these British 
soldiers with the personal situation of Michael Collins, rather than accepting it as a 
tragedy in its own right.
Like Beaslai, Coogan is sometimes unintentionally revealing. He too mentions the 
burning of some of the home addresses of the Black and Tans and elaborates to say 
that much larger scale operations would have taken place in Liverpool and 
Manchester, had not certain papers been lost in a raid. This behaviour would seem 
to be on a par with that of the Black and Tans and yet Coogan fails to provide any 
criticism.
In my opinion the most startling revelation to be found in any of those biographies, 
concerns Coogan’s telling of Vincent Fourvargve’s faith. He was a volunteer who, 
under duress, gave away the names of some of his unit. We learn that he fled to 
England in fear. Coogan tells us in a cavalier manner that - ‘Collins wasn’t fooled 
and had him shot in London, on 3rd April 1921.’163 The fact that Coogan doesn’t 
condemn this action is disturbing. Equally disturbing is the fact that most of the 
biographers would refrain from discussing such activity.
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CHAPTER 2
In the first chapter the biographers have argued as nationalists who accept the use of 
violence as a means to achieving national independence. This chapter which deals 
with the Civil War places the biographers’ nationalism into a more complex 
perspective. All the biographers have supported Collins in his violent struggle with 
the British because they viewed the British position regarding Ireland to be 
intrinsically wrong.
Nationalism can be moderately defined as ‘a sentiment based on common cultural 
characteristics that binds a population and often produces a policy of national 
independence’. However it can also be defined more extremely as an ‘exaggerated’ 
or fanatical devotion to a national community’.!
This latter definition could encompass the use of violence to achieve a ‘national 
community’. I assume the biographers subscribe to this definition. They are 
however stuck for a completely new justification when it comes to Collins inflicting 
violence on certain non-comformist members of this ‘nationalist community’. 
Nationalism has now entered into two separate divisions. Firstly, the more realistic 
nationalism that accepts the twenty-six county Free State as a working block for 
further nationalist development, through means constitutional and perhaps 
otherwise’. Secondly, that which wants to renew war with the British in a 
desperately idealistic attempt to achieve a thirty-two county Republic. All the 
biographers favour and support the pro-treaty side in the Civil War. Their critical 
appraisal of the Republican side does vary to a considerable extent, however.
Coogan claims that most of the Republicans were ‘young’, ‘brave’ and ‘fiery’ and 
some of these felt that they had forced the British to concede Dominion status and 
that the next phase of fighting would bring the Republic. The truce was, therefore, 
merely purposeful as a ‘breathing space’. Many were fighting for tradition’s sake 
and for others it had become ‘a way of life’.2 He refers to the ‘unhealthy mushroom 
growth’ in Republican membership after the Truce. The character of these 
‘Trucileers’ is denigrated when he describes them as being ‘poorly disciplined and (a 
great source of suspicion and tension to men who had fought all through the Black 
and Tan war) were former British Army men’ .3 He does point out their reluctance to
start fighting and killing members of the pro-treaty side. 4 When the fighting did 
begin, however, he further slants their character by dismissing politics as a 
motivation for their stance. Instead, their motivation was reduced to the personal
and local arena, where the irregulars- ‘ .joined in the shooting merely because
the “Free starters” had fired on tjieir comrades, or because of some friends urgings 
or example’. Coogan does not entirely strip them of their decency. For example, 
he portrays the regret that existed in certain members of the Republican company that 
assassinated Collins- ‘Tom Hales who “cried his eyes out over the killing”, took the 
initiative in making his peace with Johnny and Nancy and then, through him, other 
members of the party did likewise. One of them, Jim Hurley, broke down and cried 
in their home when he first visited them in Dublin in 1923. “How could we do it?”
he sobbed “We were too young- I was only nineteen.”  Anyone of his
assailants could have fired the fatal shot. None of them would have been proud to 
do so.’5
Like Coogan, Forester attributes alot of Republican animosity towards ‘personal 
animosity’.6 She derides the ‘Trucileers’ whose ‘bellicosity was in proportion to 
their lack of fighting experience’.? She sympathises with those youths who were 
caught up in the ‘glamour’ of 1916 Republicanism. These youths who hadn’t been 
harnessed by pre-Treaty I.R.A. discipline and comradeship suffered from ‘trigger- 
happiness.’ Yet Forester is objective enough to point out that their- ‘fellows of the 
Government forces many of them as raw as themselves, responded to their impetus 
fusillades with equal nervous energy’.8 Forester also describes the heartache 
suffered by the other Republicans after hearing of Collins’ assassination. She 
points out, however, that alot of the younger Republicans saw the death of Collins in 
terms of victory and ‘rejoiced’. Interestingly, she describes an anecdote which not 
only summates the divided atmosphere amongst Republicans on hearing this news, 
but also concerns one of the other biographers under discussion. ‘Frank O ‘ Connor 
destined to make his own reparation of love to Collins’s memory, was one of the 
youngest in arms who rejoiced then to hear of his death. He was with Erskine 
Childers and was to recall in later years “how Childers slunk away to his table 
silently, lit a cigeratte and wrote an article in praise of Collins”.’9 
Leon O’ Broin doesn’t go into to much detail when it comes to Republican character. 
In his typical fashion, he refrains from excessive condemnation and his summary of
52
them is economical and yet critical. ‘There were fanatical irregulars who were pure 
in motive though violent in method; behind them had gathered all the desperate 
elements of the population who pursued rapine for private gain. But it was 
impossible to draw distinctions between types of extremists : over all of them was 
the glamour of the Republic.’
In Desmond Ryan’s microcosm of Civil War characters, the Republicans are 
represented directly by dialogue spoken by the Republican characters and are 
perceived by those on the side of the Free State through their dialogue. Like 
Forester, he in a sense, justifies their stance on account of the 1916 'rhetoric that has 
propelled extreme Republicanism. ‘“Why shouldn’t they sing to their dream 
Republic? Hasn’t it been drilled into them for the past five years?” “Yes, reason is 
out of it!” admitted Macken.’ 11 Through his use of conversation, Ryan achieves a 
sort of impartial appreciation of the fanatical idealist. For example, one character, a 
pro-Treaty sympathiser (Harding) claims there is a touch of greatness to these
people, and that- “ if they did not exist, we should have to invent them!” As a
balancing factor, the other character (Macken) rejects this suggestion. “I would 
rather have Michael Collins little finger!”12 The three main irregular characters in 
Ryan’s work are all seen to praise Michael Collins. The respect which the 
Republican characters had for the pro-Treaty characters is summed up in the words
of one of the main advocators in the text (Tiger Doyle)- “ lets hope that none of
us meet during this little scrap and that nothing happens to Mick ” 13 In another
of the three main characters we see a regretful yet ultimately illusioned mind at work. 
‘“If we only had time to think,” murmured Considine “This tragedy might have
been averted  time to allow for each others opinions  but, no, each in
his little corner ... No still those were the times. And nothing will be as black as we 
fear .... And the Republic will be worth it all.’” 14
Tiger Doyle is seen to admit that the bulk of his side, as well as the other side, were 
far from reputable in character, but the fight is justified for the sake of ideal and 
tradition.
“I know that three quarters of our supporters are trash, as much trash as the majority 
behind your precious Free state. I am going to ram the Republic down their throats
as it was rammed down mine  Ten years of the Free State and we’ll be a
British province.”^
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Ryan sums up the factions of the fanatical Republican thinking process with a certain 
degree of pathos. ‘ “You are not much use for anything but fighting, Tiger Doyle!” 
said Macken. And they departed leaving Terence O’ Donovan with a gun falon in 
his eyes, considine with his dream and the Tiger Doyle ready to fight till he
dropped.’16
Ryan holds his most biting criticism for the women behind the Republican stance, 
and perhaps for women as a gender generally. He portrays them as fickle. ‘A week
later, Agnes Mac Gowan changed her mind................ “ ......... I was mistaken
about that written Treaty. Up the Republic!”’ 16+1 They are also seen to be 
instigators of violence. His character Bolger is heard to say- “And them bloody 
women setting the menfolk by the ears!”>6+2 When discussing the scenes after 
Collins’ death, women are seen as vulture-like creatures in a broken, promiscuops
society, ‘ everywhere property, everywhere a remittent and feverish squealer,
everywhere women crouching, loitering and offering themselves for sale, 
disappearing down alley-ways or into house with their prey.’
O’ Connor, who fought as a youth oil the Republican side manages to show a lot of 
sympathy for the young fighters on both sides. ‘All the officers and men were
young............  were not brigands, not murderers; there was nothing base or
dishonourable about them, despite the propagandists on both sides.’ >2
He does manage to cut down those from the upper echelons of the Republican side
however. He is even satirical in his put downs. He describes how the anti-Treaty
representatives were indignant at the suggestion that the Civil War had ‘........
anything whatever to do with....’ the country’s slump in the level of trade.
‘ “Really” cried one of their number, “the economic life of the nation should not be 
mixed up with politics”.’^  He discusses the intransigence of the Republicans and 
says that the reason that the Peace Conference kept breaking down was because they 
could not see why Collins wished to implement the Treaty at all’.'9 He compares the 
integrity of Collins with those from the Republican side who were primarily 
concerned with selfish interests.
‘Collins, with his elasticity and brilliance, often forgot that those whom he looked on
as heroes were sometimes vain, simple, uneducated men  He was asking them
to rise above Lilliput; they were concerned with petty jealousies, with rank and
precedence.’ 20
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In short, he forgives the young soldiers but places responsibility for the Civil War 
with the more mature Republican who were motivated by either selfishness or an 
illogical grasp on politics.
Despite his claim that his biographies on Michael Collins were unbiast in their 
nature, Piaras Beaslai portrays the Civil War in a very black and white fashion, the
anti-Treatyites being the enemy, he points out that the ‘ fact remains (and
many people forget it) that the first blood in the fraticidal strife was shed, not in 
June, but in April, and that the first shots fired in that strife were fired against Dail 
troops by Irregulars. The former were the greater sufferers, as the great majority of 
the encounters originated in attacks on them, and their attitude was simply 
defensive.’21 Not only were the Republicans the aggressors and culprits but ‘....in 
the name of Republicanism it was proposed to inflict upon the people a military 
tyranny more drastic and more inexpensible than any inflicted by the British 
Government.’22
Their concern was less political than materialistic. They wanted to place themselves 
in a position of dictatorship and when their position had become a less optimistic one
they began to seek a united Army ‘ in which their own positions would be
secured’ .23 He does point out, however, that most though not all of the leaders of 
the Republican side retained their respect for Michael Collins. Nonetheless, this is a 
comment more favourable to Collins than to the Republican side.
Beaslai’s final tribute to Collins is one that fully justifies and appreciates his actions 
and decisions, whilst at the same time is critical of those who opposed the Treaty. It 
is written in a time when the south was still very much affected by the Civil War. 
‘Today we have an Ireland of great possibilities with the most serious obstacle to her 
national progress removed by the work of Michael Collins ; but we have also a 
cynical discouraged Ireland, her fine enthusiasm quenched by the worse brutalities 
of an unnecessary Civil War and by the material in its train. But this is only a 
passing phase.’23+1
<
Beaslai the patriot, can’t stomach, an in-depth discussion of the Civil War. ‘It was 
an ugly and painful episode in the history of Ireland which none but an enemy of our
country can record with any feeling of satisfaction. It is a story of a contest in which 
neither side benefited to much advantage, which gleams of courage chivalry, 
humanity were rare on both sides.'23+2 He could never allow himself to make such 
an impartial comment regarding any aspect of the War of Independence.
During this Civil War period, de Valera was- in the context of political history - an 
inactive entity. He is either more or less ignored by the biographers in this section or 
is portrayed as the character responsible for the existence of the Civil War in Irish 
history.
Forester, who is not a critic of de Valera, doesn’t involve him significantly in this 
section of her biography and the small references she does make of his character are 
generally complimentary.
O’ Connor too, is understandably almost vacant on de Valera in this section though 
he does made one or two condemnatory comments. Probably the most significant of 
these is where he portrays de Valera as being one of the main instigators for the 
Republicans to start fighting. ‘It was clear that they were out to hinder'the election, 
and the next day made it clear that de Valera was supporting them. He made the 
famous speech about “marching over the bodies of our fellow countrymen” ; he had 
denied that it bore the meaning which most people attached to it, but a few days later 
the banned Volunteer convention was held at de Valera’s own headquarters.
 precipitated mischief everywhere. Local officers ........... now had an
authority.’ 24
Leon O’ Broin is discrete, the only potential criticism being a reference to ‘ the
restless, sometimes effeminate emotionalism of de Valera’ .25
Ryan’s platform is a very localised one, and therefore doesn’t confront the 
personality of de Valera.
It was Coogan and Beaslai - who criticise de Valera throughout their biographies - 
that tend to use this tragic episode in Irish history, as his epitaph. Whilst Collins is 
allowed to represent all that is good in nationalism, de Valera is, too conveniently
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used to represent everything that is bad in the ideology.
Coogan shows de Valera ‘angling/ for extremist support by promoting the idea of a
civil war, with speeches that- ‘ raised the spectacle of drowning the shamrock
in blood’.26 He quotes Griffith claiming that de Valera had deliberately incited the 
assassination of the plenipotentiaries who had signed the Treaty. He summarises his 
own feelings by quoting Yeats in acid-spitting form.
“Had de Valera eaten Parnell’s heart.
No loose-lipped demagogue had won the day 
No civil rancour tom the land apart.”22
His lack of political conviction is portrayed when after failing to capture extremist 
support, he fails to reject Collins’ proposed constitution before its publication as it 
would be an electoral disadvantage to do so.28 There were rumours that de Valera 
had a hand in Collins’ death. Coogan however - in his dedication to being 
informative and yet persuasive rather than merely persuasive through a totally 
selective use of history - allows himself to dismiss this conjecture. ‘This is true only 
in the sense that he was the principal architect of the overall civil war situation. My 
information is that he actively tried to prevent the actual ambush. It comes from the 
account, given by Jimmy Flynn....’29 He even points out that when de Valera 
heard the news of Collins’ death he was angry and upset.30 It is interesting that he 
ends this biography with a critical commentary on de Valera, such is the importance 
of revealing the true nature of this demagogue. He criticises de Valera’s lack of 
innovative thinking when in government and ‘his lack of an economic philosophy 
which Collins did have the ability to provide’.3i He criticises his ‘pettiness’ and 
vindictiveness in preventing a marble cross from being erected in memory of Michael 
Collins. He describes how this pettiness transcended into a policy of erasing Collins 
from Irish history. Is perhaps one of Coogan’s main intentions in the writing of this 
work to breath life into the book’s concluding comment. ‘ “It’s my considered 
opinion that in the fullness of time history will record the greatness of Collins and it 
will be recorded at my expense.” He could be right.’ 32 Even the compliment which 
he allows de Valera in this closing section is quickly turned around into a biting 
criticism.
‘His sheer durability has to be acknowledged. His courage in controlling a nervous
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temperament and in fighting the blindness that affected him increasingly from the 
start of the Second World War, his successful struggle to maintain Irish neutrality, 
all speak of a man who contained within himself elements of greatnpss. In one area, 
however, his attitude to Michael Collins, he consistently showed the small- 
mindedness of a guilty conscience.’33
Beaslai has no hesitation in pointing out bluntly, that de Valera in his rejection of the 
Treaty was responsible for the Civil war. ‘If Mr. De Valera had adhered and had 
been able to make his followers adhere, to the spirit of this declaration, the country
would have been saved many evils and much bloodshed ’34 He says that de
Valera either consciously incited civil war or otherwise was completely stupid. ‘De
V alera  declared that it might be necessary “to wade through the blood of
their fellow - countrymen to freedom”. Whether he meant this as an incitement to 
civil war or not I do not pretend to know; but if he did not realise the effect of his 
contribution to a menacing situation, he must have been incapable of realising 
anything.’35 Throughout this section in his biographies de Valera’s self-indulgence 
is referred to.
As always, the biographers in this section try to justify Collins’ decisions and 
actions. Coogan describes the ‘terrible tensions’ that existed in Collins during the 
period just prior to the Civil War in his attempts to ‘bridge the unbridgeable.’ He 
was reluctant to fight those opposed to the Treaty, he had to maintain a relationship 
with the British government, he had to control the army and was involved in fuelling 
the I.R.A. in the North while denying this to all but those involved. He outlines the 
many responsibilities Collins had to deal with during this phase. Collins drafted a 
constitution for the twenty-six counties which left out the oath to the British King, 
made no mention of the Governor General and claimed equality of status with all the 
nations of the world. Rather than suggesting a level of naivety on Collins’ behalf, 
Coogan claims that the constitution ‘... shows the nobler aspects of Collins’ vision, 
the constructive thought for the future of a man who hoped it would be one of 
Independence, democracy and peace.’36 As well as this, Coogan points out that 
Collins’ legal advisor told him that the constitution was legal.37 Collins’ loyalty to
58
the irregulars who were once his comrades is emphasised by Coogan. ‘Collins 
hesitated to assert his authority, even though he was personally involved in several 
potentially deadly incidents.’38 Coogan says that it must be conceded that Collins’ 
pact with De Valera and ‘its attendant manoeuvrings’ show him to be more of a 
‘conspirator’ than a ‘statesman’. To balance this, he says that though it might appear 
merely weak on Collins’ behalf or simply an attempt to dress his I.R.A. activity in a 
cloak or constitutionality ‘his vision of what he sought remained clear’.39 W hen 
Collins, out of necessity, had to attack the Four Courts his decision to do so was an 
‘agonised’ one.4o Once this decision was made, Coogan portrays Collins as being 
fully committed to the task of defeating the irregular forces. He had found a new 
lease of life, doing what he done best, soldering, though he was still clearly 
heartbroken. He is described weeping after the death in Brugha. ‘Collins’ 
magnanimity towards a man who had caused him so much trouble was entirely in 
character.’
And again, he weeps at the death of Harry Boland. But Coogan is willing to admit
that that ‘ was the soft man, Michael Collins, the warm-hearthed human being.
The Hard man, the soldier, was functioning efficiently, relentlessly.’42 C ollins’ 
weeping at these deaths emphasised is in all the biographies to balance his newly- 
found soldiering edge.
Forester describes the factors attributing to Collins’ ‘impossible position’ during the 
period immediately prior to the Civil war in exactly the same way as Coogan.43 She 
also describes the many responsibilities Collins was responsible for during this 
phase.44 She points out that it wasn’t for ‘personal ambition’ or ‘acclaim’ that 
Collins wanted power, but for ‘his own and Ireland’s destinies’.43 She defends his 
loyalty to old comrades. ‘It would be a mistake to over-emphasise his tendency to 
secret consultation in controversial quarters. None of his colleagues could complain 
that his loyalties were only for those who opposed him’.46 Forester defends the
Collins - De Valera pact. ‘............. in signing the pact, Collins had achieved more
than the national unity which was its primary aim. He had ensured an election ; and 
by his insistence that every interest other than Sinn Fein was to be free to contest it 
with the panel candidates he had salvaged something of its democratic character. 
Without the pact it is difficult to see how the election required under the Treaty could 
have been held. Collins could justifiably argue that by the Pact he had give the
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opposition a last chance to assume a responsible and constitutional part in restoring 
the country without losing face by having to accept the Treaty; and that the economic 
chaos, which obsessed hipr, and the grave situation in the North-East had now made 
unity the supreme consideration.’4'? She does admit however that his public 
declaration that he regarded the Pact as more important than the Treaty was ‘certainly 
imprudent : since he saw no reason why Pact and Treaty should not be co­
existent. ’48 But again, she points out that this was ‘not  evidence of any
readiness to dishonour his signature’: She admits that the repercussion of this 
declaration was that Craig refused to have any dealings with the Dail and refused to 
have a boundary commission.49 !
Regarding the constitution she is critical enough to admit that - ‘Too many loyalties
 had led him so unwisely to seek to solve Irelands problems by embracing
every method employed by .....  those from poles apart....... ’so Forester stresses
that when it became essential for Collins to attack the Four Courts, it was an 
incredibly difficult decision for him to take.
‘ “It had to come” was Collins’s comment. But was no more reconciled to it than if 
he had spoken of a loved one’s death.’si
Ryan puts Collins’ reluctance to fight his old comrades in a context of him, a great
man, being destroyed by a personified collective Irish mentality- ‘....Mhcken a
savage bitterness in his tone. “Talk to them straight and tell them you won’t have 
any damned nonsense, and tell the country their plans. Fight them now or quit! 
And don’t try either soft-soap or underground intrigue. A war party always wins 
with time and secrecy on its side. Don’t you know that?” “I would rather go back to 
the guerrilla war than that !” said Michael Collins, striding out, vital and confident. 
Macken mused on human capacity to believe what it wanted to believe. Here was 
Michael Collins gambling on human reasonableness, he usually so clear-headed. 
No, the revolutionary tide would submerge him ere it ebbed. Ireland was behind 
him, because Ireland knew instinctively that he was her bulwark against chaos. But 
she would break him as she had always broken her greatest.’52
O’Broin too, portrays Collins reluctance to fight his old comrades and how when it 
was necessary to do so it was ‘ abhorrent to him’.53
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O’ Connor tells how Collins - who had lost his practicality and had compromised the
Treaty and his party’s position - ‘ would not hear fo war’.54
His new zeal of life in the Civil War is attributed to his trust in the nobility of 
democracy. ‘Always a man of the people the people’s judgment gave him new 
heart.’55 With the Civil war came a return to Collins’ soldiering ruthlessness. ‘But 
Collins, having once set his face to the hard road, was having no more truces’.56 
Like in the other biographies this is balanced by his weeping humanity.
Beaslai describes Collins’ impossible task of having to oppose his old comrades 
while at the same time having to face up to the British. He describes his vast
responsibilities.57 Power had not gone to his head. ‘ unlike so many other
who had risen suddenly to pow er he assumed no air of aloofness.’58
He points out that because of Collins’ vast responsibilities he was unable to give
attention to the I.R.A. which had become the most ‘ serious problem of all’.59
Beaslai argues that it would have been better if the problem divisions in the I.R.A. 
had been faced up to initially. A meeting was held which postponed any such
action. However Collins is, of course, excused from this as he ‘ was not present
at the meeting above referred to and knew nothing of the agreement until
afterwards’.60
Beaslai disapproved of the Pact ‘on principal’. However his love of Collins allows 
him to provide some justification for it. ‘Perhaps all that can be said in its favour 
was that it was an attempt to make the best of a bad job, a last desperate effort to find 
an answer in face of the threat of civil war. Without it, it would have been 
impossible to hold a free election, the country would be kept in the same state of 
chaos and anarchy indefinitely, and the Treaty would have been destroyed by the 
impossibility of carrying out its provisions. It also resulted in giving the supporters 
of the Treaty a working majority.’ 6i Finally, when Collins had done his ‘utmost’ to
i
prevent civil war, and when it had become an inevitability it was his ‘duty to Ireland’ 
to commit himself. 6 2 He describes the magnitude of the task, Collins was faced 
with in fighting the irregulars. Beaslai of course, emphasises his humanity during 
the Civil war. ‘It grieved him deeply to be fighting against old comrades.’63 
Basically, the biographers describe Collins decisions and actions as being noble ones 
forced on him by his humanity.
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Coogan is not afraid to go into great detail about Collins’ activities and policy in and 
regarding the North of Ireland, since the signing of the Treaty. In fact he provides a 
whole detailed and lengthy chapter on the topic. He discusses his two-faced 
approach of officially denying keeping the fight going in the North to the British and 
Northern governments, and to his more moderate colleagues in the Free state 
government whilst at the same time supervising war like action in the six counties. 
In Collins’ defence Coogan stresses that he was in an extraordinarily delicate 
situation. He dismisses the argument from certain of his contempories that Collins’ 
Northern policy was merely activated to keep the Republicans in line. He says that 
Collins was not only the head of the Irish Free State but was also head of the I.R.B. 
and in this capacity was fully committed to seeking a thirty-two county Irish 
Republic. He points out that Collins had some faith in ending partition in an 
economic way. Yet in ‘a nutshell Collins’ vision was of a united Ireland which if 
necessary would have to be fought f o r ’ .64 Coogan balances Collins’ relaunch into 
violent means by giving detailed accounts of atrocities and forms of institutional 
prejudice that were carried out on and affected Catholics. Collins is again humanised
to evoke the readers’ sympathy. Hearing the reports of these atrocities ‘ had’a
marked influence on Collins who obviously felt for the Northern Nationalists very 
p r o f o u n d l y ’ .65 He points out that the persecution of Catholics was carried out on a 
governmental level and describes the Specials as he did the Black and Tans. To 
balance this, Coogan does describe atrocities committed by the nationalist side 
(against both Southern loyalists and Northern Protestants) and in fairness to him he 
doesn’t hold back in this regard. However he begins and ends his commentary on 
these, by stressing that they were much less horrific and regular and that their 
significance was exaggerated by propagandist newspapers. As well as this he 
impresses on the reader that Southern authorities were against attacks on Southern 
loyalists and took preventative acting. He describes graphically violent RUC 
behaviour to balance his telling of IRA atrocities in the North which are told in a less 
graphic fashion. ‘The 4th Northern Division of the I.R.A., seeking a “law abiding 
and united Ireland” by means of the unacknowledged Collins - assisted offensive, 
carried out one of the worst atrocities of the period in June 1922. It occurred at a a 
time of RUC activity in the area feuch as the murder of two Catholics whose bodies 
were subsequently found on a road deposited in holes which were originally dug by 
the I.R.A. to plant mines.’
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He goes onto quote a newspaper saying that “seven or eight farm houses belonging 
to unionists were attacked with bomb and rifle fire and five of the inhabitants slain, 
two others dangerously wounded and the residence of some burned.”66 This 
detailed rather than descriptive account lacks the imagery of its prequel. Michael 
Collins I.R.A. campaign in the North turned out to be disastrous and consequently 
was quickly brought to a close. Coogan outlines this failure in a very detailed and
blunt manner. ‘ the reaction fell heaviest on Catholics. For example, Mdy
saw sixty-three deaths in Belfast alone. Of these, forty were Catholics. In an effort 
to balance the sectarian scales the I.R.A. made things worse.’ & Yet he does refrain 
from criticising Michael Collins personally for this. Collins decisions are as always 
seen to be noble ones, made in defence of the maltreated.6»
Forester is either less honest or less informed than Coogan regarding Collins’ 
activities in the North.
She argues that he would have preferred a co-operative rather than obstructive and 
secretive policy in the North. ‘Collins knew that any I.R.A. action in the North to 
protect the nationalist minority must aggravate the attacks upon them. He also saw 
that a more effective course was to invoke the co-operation of Britain, whose troops 
continued to garrison the six counties, and who he felt should shoulder her share of 
the responsibility for its inhabitants which she retained under the Treaty. Forester 
is totally under estimating Collins’ intentions here. It was Collins fully intention to 
carry out I.R.A. activity in the North. She even goes on to say that Collins, desired 
the unity of Ireland to be based on ‘good will’.™ This hardly complies with his two- 
faced approach in dealing with the issue. She does admit that the- ‘....South’s unity 
lay in the common concerns of brothers, and as long as the Northerners actions 
threatened that deep natural bond, Collins would pawn the Treaty itself to protect 
i t . ’71 Yet she never captures his deep-seated desire that the achievement of a 
politically unified Ireland whether through violent means or otherwise was an utmost 
priority in Collins’ thinking.
She discusses Catholic persecution and claims that the ‘ B - Specials, inspired by
a far more intense loathing of Sinn Fein than the mercenary infusions of the Black 
and Tans had ever known, used their armed power to restore order by eradicating the 
nationalist minority to the best of their ability’.72 Without going into the same detail, 
she admits that there was negative activity from both sides of the fence. ‘The
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reaction of extreme groups on both sides had become a problem of immediate
concern.’73
O’ Connor doesn’t make any significant contributions in the area other than to link 
Catholic persecution with British policy, a criticism that k^he fails to counter­
balance. ‘It probably began as an outbreak of religious fanaticism, but after a little 
while it became obvious that it was being maintained from higher quarters, in the 
hope that if it were carried out with sufficient savagery it might goad on the South to 
civil war and a fresh round with England. In the later stages it was likely that even 
British Army officers were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the Treaty and 
Lloyd George’s government.’74
Beaslai doesn’t go into the Northern situation significantly, but what he does say is 
very one-sided. ‘Belfast was the scene of the terrible religious war which lasted 
some months, causing much bloodshed and destruction and involving some 
shocking murders of Catholics.’75
Leon O’ Broin doesn’t go in depth into the Northern situation. He merely outlines 
Collins’ activity in the North as a justifiable reaction to anti-Catholic pogroms.
‘In relation to an anti-Catholic pogrom in which men were driven from their 
employment, homes burned down, and women and children subjected to terrorism, 
and in one instance five members of a Belfast family murdered, I.R.A. columns, 
with directions and arms surreptitiously supplied by Collins in collaboration with 
Liam Lynch, an uncompromising anti-Treaty I.R.A. commandant, proceeded to 
make cross-border raids, to disarm police, to take hostages, to black or blow up 
roads and bridges and seize military material.’7^  There is no mention of I.R.A. 
atrocities committed in the North.
Ryan doesn’t go into the Northern issues. It is really only Coogan, therefore, who 
makes an attempt to seriously depict the situation in the North.
The biographers are all willing to admit that the same degree of ruthlessness existed 
on both sides during the Civil war. However unlike with the War of Independence 
they don’t go in to detail regarding this ruthlessness. This is somewhat unbalanced
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considering that more Irish were killed during the Civil war than in the War of 
Indepedence.
It is interesting to look at the biographers views on the leading British characters and 
their policy towards Ireland during the Civil War.
Churchill was probably the most prominent British figure in the Irish political scene 
during this period.
Coogan pays him the following tribute. ‘Whether one agrees or disagrees with the 
terms of the Treaty, it has to be conceded that Churchill’s prowess in steering the 
ratification through his own constitutional and political mine fields made a significant 
contribution to the creation of modern Ireland.’37 However later on, he accuses 
Churchill of showing favouritism towards the unionists in the North in the important 
matters of financial and military aid. ‘In these circumstances Churchill, though he 
claimed to believe in long-term Irish unity, decided like his father before him that 
Ulster would fight and Ulster would be right. After some quibbling Craig got
almost everything he asked for p lu s   By contrast it may be' noted that less
than two weeks earlier Wilson had observed with satisfaction that Churchill had 
vetoed a request from cope to supply Collins with arms, lest they be used in the 
North.’78 Coogan goes on to provide a lot more negative commentary on Churchill 
during this final section of his biography. Coogan points out that certain, ‘high- 
ranking British decision-makers’ were involved in creating anarchy in Ireland and 
supporting the ‘irregular’ side.so He also shows how a report revealing Collins’ 
illegal activity in the North was not published by the British government for fear of
revealing negative activity funded by the British tax-payer. ‘ if a critical report
had been published, the resultant spotlight would have shone not only on Michael 
Collins, but on the behaviour of the forces of law and order in the state he was trying 
to overthrow. Forces for which the British tax-payer had been committed 
unwittingly to writing a blank cheque, politically as well as e c o n o m i c a l l y . ’ si Tallents
who compiled the report was also- ‘ deeply critical of the manner in which
Sally-Flood and Craig had been allowed to run up an establishment of 48,250 para­
militaries costing nearly 25 million a year’.82 Coogan claims to be almost certain that 
it was Collins’ orders that had Wilson killed.83 The assassination of Field Marshall, 
Sir Henry Wilson by two of Collins’ men is seen to be justified. Coogan discusses
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Wilson at great length, perhaps to give a full impression of his despicable character. 
Through his affinity with Craig, he had become a very powerful figure in the 
Northern government, whose plans were oppressive to say the least, especially 
regarding the catholic population. ‘Wilson was addressing Die hard meetings and 
more and more “Tudors” were beginning to see him as the “fine leader”.’84 His 
history is summarised to support the action of the assassins. ‘Wilson’s involvementI
with every prominent anti-Nationalist and pro-Unionist cause from the Curragh 
mutiny to the foundation of the Specials would have been damning enough without 
his frequent attacks on Collins personally and the Treaty settlement in g e n e r a l . ’«5
Unlike Coogan, Forester views Churchills behaviour during the Civil War as being 
unbiast, dedicated and honest. ‘Churchill, however, unlike the Northern Prime 
Minister had signed the Treaty and believing that its provisions offered a real basis 
for a future of trust and co-operation, refused to trim them to favour either, political 
interest in Ireland at the expense of the other.’86 She defends Churchills ultimatum 
to Collins to deal with the irregulars as being based on a decision coming from a man 
who had already ‘staked his political fortunes’ on the Treaty and who had remained 
loyal to it. He had already given Collins space to deal with the problem. He was 
now obliged to act as if dealing with any dominion incompetent of self-government. 
As well as all this she points out that he could hardly be expected to sacrifice his 
future’ for a country he didn’t even like.87 According to Forester Ireland is indebted 
to Churchill. ‘Few of the Irish men who accepted the Treaty can have realised how 
much they had so far owed to Churchill. He had stated his political fortunes upon it 
and had upheld the actions of its Irish signatories in the lack of bitter attacks at home 
which had been fomented by Irishmen both North and South, who were not part of 
it. A resolute believer, in nipping trouble in the bud, he had reluctantly accepted 
Collins’s arguments for'delaying tactics that might dissipate a crisis. But now 
Collins’s most cogent reason for compromise, the lack of any mandate from the 
people, was gone Churchill undoubtedly felt that unless the provisional 
governmental asserted itself quickly he must consider the colonial offices 
responsibility for upholding law and over in any Dominion whose administration 
had shown itself incompetent to do so. Nor can he have felt bound to sacrifice his 
own future for Ireland a country to which he owed no loyalty beyond that vested in
I
the Treaty, and for which it must be added, he had small affection.’88
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She even goes as far as to compare the bravery Collins showed during the ambush 
with Churchill’s show of bravery during the Normandy landings^ „
‘A Commander-in-Chief does not fling himself on his stomach behind a ditch with a 
rifle to take pot shots at the enemy. Nor for that matter do heads of Government 
Churchill, was to show the same precipitate desire to be in the thick of the fight 
when year afterwards he was prevented from viewing the Normandy landing only 
by the personal plea of his King.’89
Wilson, the other British personality who deserves reference at this point is 
described by Forester as a horrible person, who nevertheless possessed certain 
qualities that could be appreciated by the English but not the Irish.90 Forester claims, 
that it is more likely that Collins renewed the order for Wilson’s assassination, when 
the Belfast pogroms were at their height. Forester, is to an extent critical of Collins
for presumably making this decision. ‘........ cannot be justified  He should
have foreseen - he was presumably blind to it - that the assassination of Wilson must 
further weaken the authority of the Provisional Government.’9i However, she does 
stand in his defence. The irregulars provided the perfect cover and there was little 
chance of Dunne getting caught. In theory at least, these were viable safety catches.
Collins’s final redeeming action regarding the incident was that whatever- ‘ his
involvement in Wilson’s death Collins took full responsibility for the lives of Dunne 
and O’ Sullivan. It was Me Kee and Clancy all over again.’92 
O’ Broin most significant contribution to this area involves Wilson’s assassination. 
He says that it was not ‘inconceivable’ and that he does not ‘deny the possibility’ 
that Collins was responsible for the assassination but that (at the time of his writing 
this biography) ‘no evidence has so far been produced, apart from the statement 
given to a newspaper in 1853 by Joe Dolan of Collins’ old intelligence group.’93
However if he did do it, it would be somewhat justified in Collins ‘ seeing it as
a blow worth striking in the campaign hitherto waged unsuccessfully across the 
border in defence of the people in the North who were suffering at the hands of 
W ilson’s Specials.’94 He finishes in a way that not only pays tribute to Collins 
character but also increases the possibility that he didn’t do it. ‘Collins could well 
have wanted to rescue Dunne and O’ Sullivan regardless of whether or not he had 
any prior responsibility for the act for which they had been found guilty.’95 
O’ Connor like Forester expresses a degree of sympathy towards Churchill. When 
discussing the murder of a catholic family by the Specials, O’ Connor says the
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following : ‘ “Cannibal vengeance” was how Churchill described the murder of the 
Mac Mahons, and Collins, knowing his essential humanity, had tossed upon the
council table the photograph of the murdered family. Churchill had wept ’96 O’
Connor is perhaps the most critical of Collins when it comes to the assassination of 
Wilson. First of all, he seems to be convinced that Collins was more than likely 
involved. He describes this act on his behalf as ‘inexplicable’. He says that not 
only was he being dishonest with the English cabinet but that he was also being
dishonest with his own side. He says that for the first time he ‘........ had no
conceivable earthly authority to justify it, and allowed men under his command to 
run the risk of perishing without even that poor gleam of honour that has lit so many 
a “lonely scaffold”, to use his own moving words.’97 However he appeases the 
above respites by saying that Collins was by nature a ‘conventional man’, but that he 
was in an environment deprived of his conventions. He didn’t have the temperament 
to stand alone like Griffith and Brugha.98 It seems to be the case of righting Collins’ 
wrongs through the use of a convenient concept.
He finishes on a complimentary comment- ‘Collins’ immediate concern was to save 
the lives of two brave men.’ 100
Beaslai points out that certain events during the Civil War ‘ suggested a desire
on the part of the English authorities that the enemies of the Free State should be well 
armed.’101 Infact Beaslai seems to be convinced, or at least is trying to convince, that 
the British government or the ‘English’ wanted to re-conquer the whole of Ireland.
‘ the intervention of the English Army in Ulster against the Free State brought
about a very grave situation indeed. It was quite clear that the Irish Government, or 
by its abdication, afford the English an excuse for re-invading the country, and thus 
acquiesce in the defeat of all hopes of Irish freedom.’102
Ryan doesn’t contribute to this area significantly.
Collin’s assassination will be looked at, only in so far as it reveals something about 
the biographers nationalist mentality, honesty and determination to reveal the truth. 
Coogan disregards conspiracy theories (some of which included the involvement of 
the British Secret Service) and the opportunity to blacken the Republican character. 
He began by saying that ‘ it appears that there was a lot less to the tragedy
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than met the eye of many a theorist.’ 103 Up until the writing of his book a lot of 
people with an insight into the assassination, alleged that Mac Peake a machine- 
gunner in Collins’ convoy (who afterwards deserted to the Republican side) 
participated in his killing. Some of the biographers under discussion make this 
allegation. Coogan, however, is perceptive enough in his research and honest 
enough in his portrayal of the converted Republican to elevate him from this 
insinuation. ‘Those were harsh times and it can be taken for granted that he had 
anything to do with Collins’ deaths, he would hardly have survived his arrest, never 
mind his imprisonment.’ 104 He also points out that the ‘unfortunate’ Emmett Dalton
was the ‘ target for the most sustained allegations’ and that he would rather have
‘ shot himself sooner than have injured Collins’.]°5
Coogan is willing to say that Collins and his convey were drinking and enjoying 
themselves on the day of the assassination, and is even quite critical of this. ‘Forget 
the war, relax, and take a drink, have a chat and a joke. It was human but it was not 
wartime behaviour.’
Like Coogan, Forester defends Me Peake though not to the same extent. ‘Me Peake 
had started off with a burst of machine - gun fire, but after a short time the gun no 
longer opened properly but fired single shots, like a rifle. Only later when Me Peake 
deserted to the Republicans taking the Slievenamon with him, would this failure take 
a sinister Significance. The shot that found him was almost certainly a ricochet, 
possibly off the armoured car.’ 107 Forester doesn’t go into any detail regarding the 
controversy surrounding Collins death.
It is interesting that in paying Collins his final tributes she makes a slight reference to 
his relationship with women by referring to him as ‘the laughing Boy of the Dublin
women’.108
O’ Broin tribute to Collins can also be seen as a criticism of those who lacked reality 
in opposing him during the Civil War.
‘A quarter-century of uneasy dominionship was succeeded by a republic as free as 
any in the world, a republic accepted by Irishmen whether they originally followed
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Collins’ lead or not. That is all to the good, and yet it is now apparent that the most 
tragic element in Collins’ death was that it occurred at all, for it was as unnecessary 
as the bitter Civil War which the compassionate realist strove so hard and risked so 
much to a v o i d . ’ 109
Beaslai is hostile enough to accuse Me Peake, without significant evidence, of being 
involved in the assassination of Collins.
I
‘It may be mentioned here that the machine gun in the armoured car “jammed” after 
the short time. The machine gunner Mac Peake, not long after this occurrence, 
deserted to the irregulars bringing an armoured car with him.’
!
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CHAPTER 3
PART ONE: SCREENPLAY
The Neil Jordan movie attempts to condense the main events in Michael Collins’ life 
into just over two hours of celluloid drama. His artistic licence allows him to tally 
with facts and merge characters for coherency and dramatic effect. This is relevant 
to the thesis, only insofar as it effects his nationalist message.
Before beginning a discussion through the films content, it should be noted that there 
are some slight differences between the final screenplay and the film. These will be 
pointed out where required.
The film introduces Collins and the rebels fighting, bravely outnumbered, in the 
G.P.O. After their defeat, they are rounded up and seen to be maltreated. Collins is 
standing in line beside de Valera. Collins is portrayed as fiery, de Valera as 
courteous. Next comes the executions of the 1916 leaders. They are seen to bravely 
confront the firing squad. This is accompanied by a voice over from de Valera. 
‘The fact that I was born in America might save me hind, Either way I am ready for 
what comes.’1 These introductory scenes demand our respect for the ultimate 
commitments of nationalism. The rest of the action takes places between 1918 and 
1922. Collins’ relationship with Kitty O’ Shea and Harry Boland are introduced. 
These characters are utilised as channels for Collins’ humanity. Jordan depicts the 
effect Kitty’s singing voice has on Collins. ‘When the song finishes, his eyes are 
moist.’2 When making ruthless decisions Collins is - in several cases throughout the 
film - seen to be conscientious as regards involving others in his folly. This it has 
to be said is uncharacteristic of Collins. Whilst he was very worried and concerned 
for those involved in such life-threatening activities he nonetheless saw their 
involvement as essential for the cause. ‘Collins: Could you bear it? Boland: You 
know I could. It’s you I’m worried about.’3
This shows identification with Collins and his approach and also places the element 
of danger more on Collins personally. Historians have recorded Collins’ drilling 
instructions to his ‘squad’ quite differently to Jordans:
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‘Collins: Don’t expect it to be pleasant 
[Pause]
Collins: And anyone who has qualms better leave now. 
[Pause. No one moves. Vinny Byrne pipes up]
Byrne: Would they have got past the door?
[The tension in the air is dispersed by laughter. And we see how young the MEN 
really are. Collins shakes his head.]
Collins: They would have, Vinny. I won’t force this on anyone.’4
Desmond Ryan’s Collins doesn’t come across as sympathetic with the squad as in 
the film:
“...not playing at soldiers any bloody coward present could go home now at
a gallop and snow to the heals of lousers like th a t a test tonight ”5
Collins’ own words and outlook in the film are never challenged in any significant 
way. He is the undisputed hero of the piece and despite Jordan’s argument, his 
perspective is the only one that is really considered. He defends his activities as 
being essential. He hates violence and hates himself for utilising it but what he has 
become is a product of the British administration rather than a product of free choice. 
He is, therefore, ultimately a victim, whose actions were determined not from 
personal decision but from outside forces separate from himself. The viewer can 
therefore alienate the violence from Collins.
‘Collins:
Boland:
Collins:
Collins:
myself
Yeah, I want peace and quiet, I want it so much I’d die for it. 
You’d kill for it first.
No not first, last. After centuries of trying to talk reason. After 
years of parliamentary chicanery. After every other road has 
been exhausted. After they’ve made it clearer than the daylight
that you’ve no alternative.......................
I hate them. Not for their race. Not for their brutality. I hate 
them because they’ve left us no way out. I hate whoever put a 
gun in young Nad Tannin’s hand. I know its me, and I hate 
for it. And I hate them so much that I have to do that. I hate
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them for making hate necessary. And I ’ll do what I have to to 
end it.’6
With the Bloody Sunday assassinations Collins is seen not to force the hand of his 
Squad when it comes to participating in the event.
‘Collins: .............. so if anyone’s not up to it, they have to say so now.
[Collins waits for some of them to step down. No one moves, 
however.]
Collins: Come on, lads. I know what some of you have been through.
There’s no shame in pulling out.....
[Again, there is no response. Collins seems about to cry]’7
This is a collective decision rather than a dictated instruction which would have been 
more in character with Collins. The assassinations themselves are intricate with 
scenes of Collins being comforted by Kitty Kiernan. The scene is, therefore, turned 
around to display Collins’ angst at having to partake in what he considered to be 
necessary action rather than dealing with an uninterrupted vision of the 
assassinations, whereby their brutality could be more clearly captured.
Another factor which takes the attention away from the actual assassinations are 
prequealing scenes of Ned Broy (whom Stephen Rea portrays as a very soft, likable 
man and who was one of the principal players in the film up to this stage) being 
hanged matter-of-factly by bored Black and Tans. 8 When Collins finds out about 
Broy he is devastated. In one of the assassinations a Secret Service man uses a 
woman to shield him from the assassins.9 This, in effect, detracts sympathy from
the victim. In another of the assassinations a young volunteer, shaking
uncontrollably, is told by the Secret Service man to
‘......  shoot straight this time.
[Cut to: The SS man, standing by the window. On a bed beside 
him, we see his companion, already dead. The young Volunteer 
steadies his hand and shoots.]’10
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This shows a lack of maliciousness in the youth. Only one of the assassinations is 
depicted as ruthless and as will be see in the comments in the film diary, Jordan had 
difficulty in including it. Whilst not exactly historically accurate, Jordan’s scene on 
the Croke Park massacre is a fair representation of the carnage inflicted on civilians 
by the British forces on that evening. The Bloody Sunday assassinations are 
discussed again in the following section on Jordan’s film diary.
Collins humanity towards his fellow man and friends is again emphasised when he 
dramatically witnesses his friend Cullen being hanged in a warehouse by the British 
forces. He is in the company of Boland who has to restrain him from attacking the 
British officers.
‘[Collins’ face, struggling against Boland’s hand - We hear the 
sickening screams of Cullen as he is being roughed up below. 
Every scream is echoed in the mute pain and fury on Collins’s 
face. But for once, Boland’s grip is, immovable. We see a rope 
strung over the strut of the skylight. We hear the scraping of a 
chair. We hear the sound of Cullen praying, then the chair is 
kicked. Silence, Collins’s face. Blood is flowing from 
Boland’s hand. Sounds of the door opening, footsteps 
retreating, once more Boland removes his grip],
Boland: I’m sorry, Mick. Can’t let them take you.
[Collins turns his head, rises, looks down through the skylight. 
We see Cullen swinging from the rope below.]11
Again the focus is on Collins’s emotiqnal hardship as result of his humanity and 
actions outside of his control. Collins is again the victim of ruthlessness rather than 
the instigator of it.
When things start to look like Civil War the audience is made sympathise further 
with Collins when they hear Kitty O’ Shea utter to him with the greatest insincerity : 
‘I hate you’.*2 Collins’s reluctance to fight his old comrades is well emphasised. He 
is seen desperately trying to persuade members of the Four Courts Blockade to stop 
their foolishness and tells members of the cabinet that he would rather anarchy than 
Civil War. He is met with hostility whilst giving pro-Treaty speeches. These scenes
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are mixed with Collins proposing to Kitty and an emotional last meeting with Harry 
Boland.
The attack on the Four Courts depicts the harrowing effect that the initiation into 
Civil War had on Collins.
‘Collins: How would you like a new boss?
[The gun fires again and again. Collins turns and walk away. 
The sound of the gun firing seems to reverberate through him.
He keeps walking, as if he cannot stand to see what is 
happening. Each successive explosion is etched on his face.]’13
By his walking away from the carnage, he is in effect disassociated from it. On 
hearing the death of Cathal Brugha Collins refers to him with informal warmth.
‘Officer: They got Brugha, Mike.
Collins: You mean Cathal.
Officer: Yes
Collins: Then say so.’14
As a birther emphasis on Collins’s humanity this scene is followed by Collins trying 
to get to Boland before the Free Staters kill him. The scenes of Boland trying to 
escape are mixed with scenes of Collins and O’ Reilly driving frantically towards the 
docklands where he is being pursued. Harry Boland is swimming in the Liffey 
when a young Free Stater shoots him. In the screenplay the youth is seen to smile 
before he shoots him. This is erased from the film. Perhaps this would portray 
Collins’s side in too menacing a light. The main focus of the films depiction of this 
fatality is on Collins’s extreme emotional reaction. This is the only scene in the film 
where Free Stater ruthlessness is portrayed and it is covered up by its focus on 
Collins.
‘Collins: (Softly) What happened? Who closed your eyes?
[The young Free stater steps forward.]
Free Stater: He was trying to make it across the river, Sir. I saw him and
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I didn’t ask you.
Who did you ask?
[Collins rises in sudden fury and drags him towards the edge.]
I asked him - 
But he’s dead, Sir -
And you killed him, you little uninfonned git - 
[Collins dangles him over the water edge]
You plugged him, you little Free state shit - you were meant to 
protect him -
He was one of them, Sir -
[Collins suddenly drops him in the water twenty feet below. He 
watches him splash and struggle.]
No, sonny. You don’t understand. He was one of us.’
In the film Collins doesn’t actually throw him into the water. Perhaps this was 
considered to be to violent an action for Collins to personally undertake. This whole 
episode - being a fictitious vehicle to yet again portray Collins’ humanity within the 
Civil War - is perhaps taking artistic liberty to far. Boland is the only anti-treatyite 
who is seen to be killed during the Civil War. The Civil War is used by Jordan to 
show the pathos and tragedy of the time. It’s ruthlessness and Collins’s capacity to 
be ruthless is never properly portrayed.
During his final journey to West Cork he passes the remains of his house which was 
burnt by the British forces during the War of Indépendance. This allows him further 
respect from the audience. Just before the arrtbush Collins is heard to make a 
characteristic joke about his forthcoming wedding. This portrays his last moment of 
humanity. Kitty Kiernan is seen going into a shop to fit on a wedding dress. This 
scene is intercut with Collins’ ambush. The episode is played with an ominously 
soft and sentimental song growing in the background. This technique of playing on 
the emotions comes to a climax when Collins’s body is seen to be no more than aI
corpse, and when Kitty’s joy is transformed into terror on hearing the news. The 
film ends in the words of Joe O’ Reilly. ‘No regrets, Kit, That's what he’d say.’ >6 
This sums up the films mentality towards Collins and his activities. Most scenes in
plugged him from above.
83
Collins: 
Free Stater:
Collins: 
Free Stater: 
Collins:
Collins:
Free Stater:
Collins:
the film are used in some way either to compliment Collins’ character or justify his 
cause. It is by no means as objective a piece as it could be or as it should be, 
considering that it claims to represent history. Jordan makes the following comment 
in his diary but never manages to justify it in the finished film.
‘What Collins is best at is appalling. And in some ways he appals himself.’ i? The 
fact that a lot of emphasis is placed on Collins’s monygomous relationship with 
Kitty Kiernan in the film is perhaps another means of creating the unblemished hero. 
It can be argued that the relationship was used for coherency and dramatic effect. 
Yet it has to be admitted that, irrelevant of the intentions, the focus on this 
encapculated romance does have the effect of deepening the tragedy of Michael 
Collins’s faith, and also deepens the viewers appreciation of Collins’s caring nature. 
Jordan says that by excluding the Treaty negotiations in London it was impossible
for him to show Collins in the company of Lady Lavery and to present ‘ the
popular romantic image of Collins as an Irish Don Juan among the English upper
I
classes ............  I don’t say it didn’t happen. But since we don’t take him to
London, we don’t see it.’18 This however doesn’t justify him not showing Collins 
liaising, even subtly, with other women.
The assassination of detectives by the Squad are almost invariably justified. This is 
done by showing a scene in close proximity with an assassination that alienates the 
detective from any possible sympathy. The first detective to be assassinated in the 
film is Hoey. The previous scene shows a tortured Tom Cullen, one of Collins’s 
men, being dumped on the streets. He reveals Hoey as the man responsible for his 
torture. This is seen to devastate Collins. The scene prior to this shows Smith, 
Kavanagh and Hoey goading Cullen before this assault in the Castle, and Hoey is 
seen to initiative the torture. Incidently both Smith and Kavanagh are also seen to be 
assassinated in the film.
‘Int. Hoey’s Room. Day.
Smith, Kavanagh and Hoey stand there as Cullen is pulled in. Hoey grabs Cullen 
and throws him against a filing cabinet.
»
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Hoey: You don’t threaten us,.you Fenian swine.
[Cullen stands, Hoey comes towards him and hits him again.] 
We’re the ones that threaten you -
[Smith grabs the letter from the table, and holds it up to Cullen’s 
face.]
What does this mean - 
It means you can get out now -
[Hoey hits him with a chair. Cullen falls to the floor, spitting 
blood.]
What? Give up my jobs? Miss out on all the fun?'
Or face the music, Hoey - 
[Smith kicks him on the floor.]
You’re the only one’ll make music here, boy - ]’i9
Hoey:
Smith:
Cullen:
Hoey:
Cullen:
Smith:
This scene is contrasted with the young assassin Vinny Byrne, praying in church 
before the assassination.20 The assassination scene is a short and fast-paced one with 
the focus on the assassin’s escape rather than a lingering scene with a focus on the 
target.
A few scenes later Kavanagh is shot, the memory of his involvement in Cullen’s 
torture still fresh in the viewers mind. This is even put to comic effect, when we see 
Collins complains about the amount of bullets used on Kavanagh.
‘Collins: Riddled! What’re you going round riddling people for? Ten or
This has the effect of elevating the seriousness of the assassination. Detective Smith 
is assassinated on his return from a raid on a Collins safe house. During the raid he 
is seen to slap a woman to the ground in front of her children. The twinning of this 
scene with a less graphically disturbing depiction of his assassination justifies the 
latter action to some extent, in the eyes of the viewer.
Collins:
Youth:
twenty bullets when the one would do!
We just wanted to be sure he wouldn’t get up but -
Lads - just try to remember they don’t grow on trees, all right?’
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‘93. Int. Hallway, Dawn.
A woman screaming on the stairway, a broad of kids behind her. The door gives 
way and Smith and his men pile in. Smith backhands the woman, sending her 
tumbling to the floor.
95. Ext. Dame Street, Dawn
Smith, returning from the raid, in foul humour.................
A goggled motorcyclist roaring towards him. From the side-car another goggled 
youth pulls a mauser pistol and shots him many times.’2*
In the film several Belfast detectives are brought down from Dublin to replace the 
dead G - men. They are led by Mac Bride who gives a speech to Broy on how he 
and his men are going to solve the Michael Collins problem. This is put to comic 
effect when he and his men enter a car after the completion of this speech and are 
anachronistically blown up. Their attempt to capture Collins lasted literally minutes. 
Theiri assassination, is therefore once more undermined by the humorous content of 
the scene.
‘Int. Castle Day.
Mac Bride: Since you Dublin boys can’t sort out this Collins, I suppose it’s
Smith: Someone shut her up -
[The children wail. The R.I.C. men begin to take the place 
apart.]
Broy:
up to us. You got his file? 
Yes, Sir
Broy:
Mac Bride:
Mac Bride: I want a list. Of anyone with a remote connection with this 
geezer. And I want them lifted - tonight.
You’ll find it’s not that simple, sir.
But it is simple, Mr. Broy. We’ll make it that simple.
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98. Ext. Castle Courtyard. Day
Mac Bride: There’s a new regime in here and it’s starting now.
[He walks to the car, followed by his team. Gets inside.]
Mac Bride: A bit of Belfast efficiency is what they need.
[The driver starts the motor. The car blows up.]
The Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries are portrayed in a very disturbing manner 
whereas the excesses on the nationalist side during the War of Indépendance is never 
emphasised. That said, outside of newsreel footage, they are only portrayed in two 
scenes, the Croke Park massacre and an attack on a tenement. The attack on the 
tenement from their truck is visually shocking. They are blown up when a kid lobs a 
petrol-bomb at them. The fact that it is a child who throws the bomb dissuades the 
viewer from considering this a violent reaction. Therefore, the sympathy for the 
tenement dwellers is in no way jeopardised. It is worth noting that the scene in the 
film is a slightly less shocking display of barbarity than the one in the final draft of 
the screenplay. In the screenplay the Black and Tans aren't provided any source of 
motivation. In the film they are given the feeble motivation of the crowd throwing 
vegetables at them.
‘Dublin Tenant. Night.
A crossly tender full of Black and Tans is shooting up a tenement street. Again, the 
peacemakers are having a ball. Then from a street above a kid lobs a petrol-bomb 
into the back of the lorry. The lorry explodes in flame.’23
From early in the film de Valera is built up as the villain responsible for the Civil 
War. On hearing Ned Broy’s warning about a midnight raid on the leaders of Sinn 
Fein Collins warns de Valera. This gives Jordan a chance to show de Valera’s 
dominating stubbornness. He refuses to act on the warning and decides to put it to 
the vote as to whether or not the rest of the leaders should return home that evening.
In rejection de Valera ‘ raises his hand. As does the rest of the gathering, but
for Collins and Boland.’24
De Valera shares a comical scene with Collins and Harry Boland during his Lincoln
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Jail escape in which he assumes the role of a women. However even here de Valera 
is denied any warmth of character, as the scene ends with an ice-cold undertone.
‘Boland: Oh fun and games all the way, chief.
De Valera: I know, I read the papers
[De Valera isn’t laughing now. But no one seems to notice.]’25
As the film progresses de Valera’s egocentricity is more and more emphasised. 
When Collins pleads with de Valera to allow Boland to stay in Ireland with him de 
Valera says that he can’t run his campaign without him. De Valera replies sharply : 
‘You could run it without me.’26
De Valera is portrayed as being less concerned about achieving a Republic than 
maintaining his own person.
‘Boland: Why does he want me?
Collins: He’s afraid to leave the two of us together. We might achieve
that republic he wants to talk to the world about.’27
De Valera’s jealously of Collins is portrayed when we hear him say softly, ‘W e’ll
see who’s the big fella.’28
We see him to be out of tune with what is going on in the country when he makes a 
militarily suicidal request for large scale engagements so as to appease the allegations 
that Collins’ guerrilla methods were murderous. Collins rebukes him for his lack of 
practicality and his lack of presence in the county.
'Collins: War is murder. Sheer bloody murder. If you’d been here for
the last year, you’d know that.’28
Collins however is still seen to show loyalty and obedience to de Valera, and gives 
in to de Valera’s request.
‘Collins: You’re right. I should do what I’m told.
[He eyes the Squad.]
Collins: I suppose we have to do it then.
[They begin to arm up.]’30
De Valera is seen to be more concerned with his political future than with achieving 
as much political freedom as possible for his country when he refuses to join the 
delegation to debate a treaty with the British government. Collins, the centre of the 
viewers trust in the film, is heard to say to Harry Boland- ‘They can’t give us the 
Republic. It’s not within their comprehension. And thats why Dev sent me Harry.
Collins: He wanted someone else to bring back the bad news.’31
Evidence of this is even given in de Valera’s expression when confronted by 
Collins.
‘Collins: It’s the truth. Otherwise you would have gone yourself.
[De Valera says nothing, but his silence says it all. He avoids 
Collins’ eyes.]32
Jordan himself says that his ‘conclusion in the screenplay is that de Valera didn’t go 
[to London] because in the course of his prior negotiations to see whether there was 
any basis for talks, he learned that they were not willing to go far enough. He sent
Collins, first in the hope that he could get a better dead and , secondly, because he
didn’t want to be associated with any compromise that might result.’33 In reality 
however it is only the latter conclusion that receives any precedence in the 
screenplay. Jordan asks Alan Rickman to portray a lack of political consistency in 
De Valera’s behaviour in the Treaty Debates in the Dail.
‘I ask him to deliver it as if he doesn’t know, until the words come out, what he is 
about to say. And he does it. How, I don’t know, but one has the impression of an 
earth-shattering decision being taken in mid-speech, that is made almost before he is 
aware of it.’34
Certain newspaper critics have attacked the Michael Collins film for implying that de 
Valera was somehow implicated in the assassination of Collins. In his diary Jordan 
list three assumptions he made in the film regarding Collins’ presence in West Cork:
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1. That some meeting was planned with certain members of the Republicans
side;
2. De Valera was powerless at the time;
3. That Collins was shot by the West Cork I.R.A.35
These assumptions do not implicate de Valera’s involvement in the assassination, 
and it is my opinion that he did not exceed on these assumptions in the finished film. 
A manipulative youth is seen to be the messenger between Collins and de Valera. 
In his first scene with de Valera, he is seen to be an instigator while de Valera is 
seen to be a nerve-shattered submissive. ‘De Valera, sitting by a fire alone. He is 
shivering, his eyes burning. The Youth enters.
De Valera: 
Youth:
De Valera: 
Youth:
De Valera:
Youth:
De Valera: 
Youth:
Is it him?
Looks like it. Looks like he wants to meet - 
Doesn’t he know it’s out of my hands?
Whose hands is it in then, chief?
[De Valera mutters to himself.]
You should have listened to me, Michael. You heard but you
didn’t listen....
Listened to what?
So can I trust him?
Can you trust anyone these days, Chief?
[De Valera looks up like a hunted animal. The Youth smiles. 
There is no knowing what his smile means.]’36
This de Valera is reminiscent of Coogan’s temporarily insane de Valera of the 1916 
rising. He is seen here to have lost control both of himself and of his political power. 
The youth with the ominous smile is the focus of potential devilment in the scene. 
Even in this state however he is seen to be only capable of an idiosyncratic outlook.
‘You should have listened to me Michael. You heard but you didn’t listen ’
When Collins meets the youth he is frustrated by him. He arranges to meet de 
Valera through the Youth. The screenplay describes the youth here, as essentially a
bad character. ‘[The youth sm iles A killer smile, with no remorse.]’ w The
youth tells de Valera of Collins desire to meet. De Valera’s nervous condition has
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worsened and gives the youth no reply. In this scene de Valera is seen to be a 
broken man. He is even seen to go as far in his nervous ramblings as to ask Harry 
Boland for forgiveness.
‘The smiling Youth walks over to de Valera. De Valera is shaking uncontrollably.
Oh God help us..........
So I take it you heard?
Oh Jesus, Mick, God forgive us, Harry- 
[The Youth smiles. He seems to be enjoying de Valera’s 
nervous breakdown.]
Have you any reply?
[De Valera walks off into the night like a lost soul.]
He’s come all this way. Be kind of rude not to give him an 
answ er............
[The Youth stands until de Valera has vanished into the night. 
Then he turns and walks slowly back to the pub.]’38
The Youth returns to Collins and tells him that de Valera will meet him at Beal na 
mBlaith. This, despite the fact that de Valera had given the youth no reply on 
whether he would see Collins or not. There is therefore no implication in the 
screenplay to suggest that he was involved in the assassination. It is the Youth who 
takes over the role of villain at this critical stage. The youth who kills Collins is the 
same one, that is seen to delegate between de Valera and Collins in the previous 
scenes. He is portrayed demonically both in the screenplay and film. It is another 
instance where Jordan needs an identifiable villain.
De Valera: 
Youth:
De Valera:
Youth:
Youth:
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PART TWO: THE FILM DIARY
C H A PTER  3
Ironically, Jordan’s early film ‘Angel’ (1982) has been criticised from certain 
quarters for the opposite reasons that ‘Michael Collins’ has faced criticism. One of 
the contributors to the most authoritative book on the history of Irish cinema to date, 
John Hill, claims that Jordan’s Angel' represents the I.R.A. and the Irish in general 
as irrational beings. 39 Jordan himself admits that - ‘In Ireland I was accused of 
misusing public fund, portraying the Irish as irrational and prone to atavistic 
violence, reinforcing colonial stereotypes, etc.’40 Personally, I don’t consider this 
criticism to have any bearing.
In his Film Diary, Jordan mentions how an associate criticised his first draft because
it ‘............. lacked an identifiable villain. Now this villain can only be the British
government, Empire, security forces, or a combination of all three. For Irish 
writers, struggling with the complexity of their history, this is always a problem. 
For us the division within the island are as fascinating as those across the Irish sea. 
The wider world, though, want to see it in more simplistic terms.’4* This passage 
introduces some of the difficulties Jordan will be faced with in trying to maintain an 
objective and morally acceptable piece. First of all, because his first draft lacked an 
‘identifiable villain’ he deemed it to be necessary - so to sustain a dramatic cinematic 
structure - to enhance the presence of an identifiable villain in the second draft. He is 
therefore being pressured by drama rather than reality to create a blatantly simplistic 
enemy. He identifies this villain as being some component of the British 
administration. The good guy bad guy scenario is further enhanced by his 
elimination of the internal strife between unionists and nationalist so as to satisfy 
‘wider world’ consumerism.
He admits that the Mansion house split was centred on the oath rather than partition 
though the reverse seems to be the case in the movie. His arguments for this and 
leaving out the Treaty debates, the activities of the Northern Irish government and 
the ambiguity regarding de Valera’s instructions to the Treaty delegates is that
‘.........  all of these are so complex that they would need another movie all to
themselves.’42 Such simplifiers make the decisions and actions of the Irish delegates 
more straight cut and noble, and the taking away of de Valera’s ambiguity of 
character makes him a more ‘identifiable villain’. He says that the Mansion House
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scenes are ‘history but dead wood’.43 Again the primary concern is dramatic effect.
Jordan says that this film intends to show ‘ the choices the British Empire made
that led to an irresistible drift towards violent situations, the exhilaration of violence, 
the grotesque conclusions of its outcome’.44 This seems to place the full 
responsibility for the violence with the British. It must be remembered that not all 
people treat violence with violence.
Jordan says that if ‘ one were to argue the historical point one would have to
mention so many things.’45 If Jordan therefore is not as he puts it arguing the 
‘historical point’ it is infeasible that his film should claim to represent history, as it 
does.
Jordan’s intentions for the film are questioned when it comes to the Bloody Sunday 
assassinations. Let it be noted that the scene described below is reduced to a small 
component of the films coverage of the assassinations, whereby, in the overall 
context, as much sympathy is placed on the assassins as on the targets. One of the 
other target’s is portrayed in a villainous role and the whole episode is intercut with a 
romantic image of Collins despairing in the company of Kitty O’ Shea. It reveals 
something of Jordan’s mindset and intentions for the film that he had to actually 
question putting in such a scene as described below. It must be remembered that the 
finished scene is a very short one, and the only one of its type in the entire film. 
‘Brendan Gleeson told me how they would ask their victims did they want to say a 
prayer, and before the prayer had concluded would pull the trigger. One of the most 
bizarre concepts of mercy I ’ve ever come across. We devise a track round the 
officers face, a series of handguns pointed to his head as he prays. Then the camera 
tracks past the officers, isolates Brendan’s face and he pull the trigger. For the first 
time I wonder about the moral perspectives of what we’re doing. The scene is so 
brutal and pitiless. The prayer gives the officer an inescapable dignity. Then I 
realise it has to be that way. The only way to make it less disturbing would be to 
cast the officer in a villainous light, the ultimate dishonesty. It must have been that 
brutal. And the presentations of it should make an audience question their moral 
parameters.’
Jordan says that he realises ‘ that there is something about either the character
of Michael Collins or Liams portrayal of him that makes him impossible to dislike,
93
whatever the horror of the events he set in motion. In fact the reverse could rather 
alarmingly be true. You admire him for his ruthlessness.’47 If so much emphasis 
wasn’t placed on Collins as the romantic and the loyal friend and if the ruthlessness 
was more attached to his persona than it is in the film, then perhaps the admiration 
for him would have been slightly reduced.
TH E TR EATY
This production, unlike the Neil Jordan film, manages to portray the dilemmas and 
mentalities of the British side as well as of the Irish side. The characters as 
presented in the film, by and large do justice to their historical accuracy, though 
unfortunately certain members of the cast may have depended too much on 
charicatures . The film spans from de Valera’s negotiations during the truce period 
to the Treaty debates between the Irish and British delegations and ends.with the 
signing of the Treaty.
De Valera is give a more sympathie portrayal here than in Jordan’s movie. Just 
before his release from prison in Dublin he is brought into the office of a British 
official. He is told by him that a young British officer had recently been shot in the 
Dublin mountains in front of two lady friends and that his funeral was taking place 
below. The official goes on to rebuke the Irish side for hiding behind ‘hedges and 
stone walls”. The conversation ends with the sharp quip from de Valera: ‘Do you 
call hiding behind that [armoured vehicle down below] any better.” This 
confrontation refers to the ruthless methods carried out by both sides in the War of 
Independence. This objective honesty is maintained throughout the film. De Valera 
in winning this confrontation achieves a certain respect from the viewer. As well as 
this the Irish side in the War of Independence receives a certain justification. The 
divide between de Valera and Collins is explored in the film. De Valera tells Brugha 
and Childers, early in the piece that:
“Michael and I are not seeing eye to eye of late.” Collins is seen to criticise him for 
attacking the Four Courts. Collins expresses anger towards de Valera that he was 
not invited to the original peace talks with Lloyd George:
“Do as you will, you always do.”
De Valera is given advice to justify this decision.
“You will be of more value as the spectra back in Dublin.”
Lady Lavery Compliments him by saying he has a “fine head, an intellectual head”. 
After his return from London, a crowd is seen to enter the Mansion House and one 
fellow amongst them is heard to compliment de Valera:
“You have to hand it to Dev, he achieved a conference with no preconditions.”
When the Treaty negotiations are arranged de Valera, Brugha and stack refuse to go.
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De Valera argues that he “must never be seen to compromise as head of state”. 
Collins is requested but not ordered to go. This is in seen to furiate him as he is their 
only unknown quantity. He says to Batt O’Connor: “They don’t have the courage 
to go.” He points out that de Valera deliberately used his own casting vote to decide 
not to go, and that he deliberately sent a divided team so that he could keep the “reign 
in his hand”. However Collins’ perspective isn’t used to outweigh de Valera’s. One 
scene shows de Valera praying to a painting of the Virgin Mary, to an overvoice of 
de Valera reading the conditions of his letter to the Treaty plenipotentiaries before 
they begin the negotiations. This gives de Valera’s instructions a sense of sincerity.
I •
De Valera religious association is again emphasised when he questions a bishop on 
the morality of renewing a war with the British by rejecting a compulsory oath of 
allegiance to the British King. De Valera ask the Bishop: “Will I burn in hell.”
The bishop replies: “You of all men I know abhors violence - Given certain 
circumstances war can be just.”
This de Valera is far more three-dimensional and conscientious than Jordan. De 
Valera is seen to be pre-occupied with the oath of allegiance. He instructs Griffith to 
tell the British delegations that the Irish side would be willing to “accept even war” 
as an alternative to a refussal to negate the oath clause. Griffith is seen to 
vehemently reject this instruction and suggests that De Valera returns to the 
negotiations. To this de Valera says it won’t be necessary if the delegations try to 
blame the North and partition for the breakdown of negotiations. When Griffith 
leaves the scene, Childers asks de Valera whether or not this also meant a rejection 
of the dominion status clauses. De Valera’s reply is : “Yes it does”. This scene 
suggests political intransigence and naivety on de Valera’s part.
Early on in the film, de Valera is heard to say that the “oath to the Republic never 
meant more to me than to do the best for my county”. The last scene with de Valera 
in it shows him being hypocratic in his politics. He is seen giving an open-air 
speech in Dublin advocating the pursuit of a 32 county Republic. “You are either all 
free or not free. Continue to struggle until you’ve go the whole of it.”
At the start of the film Lloyd George and F.M. Wilson are seen to argue about the 
government of Ireland. After his departure Lloyd George says to his beloved
secretary that Wilson is not objective about Ireland and that his sympathies rest with 
the unionists in the North. The fact that this comment was made within an intimate 
zone gives evidence to its sincerity. If he thinks this of Wilson he himself obviously 
intends to approach the Irish situation without bias. His human side is played out in 
his relationship with his secretary. One scene shows them romancing under a tree 
with soft music in the background. In another scene, he dances ecstatically with his 
secretary after receiving Griffith’s guarantee that he would not break on the oath. 
Attention is given to the difficulties of his political dilemma. He tells his secretary, 
who is also used as his sounding board in the film, that the country was not united 
on Ireland and that he had to endure a weak coalition government. Throughout the 
film Lloyd George is portrayed as a ruthless political manipulator and strategist. Yet 
there are enough references to his humanity in the film to prevent his political 
behaviour detracting from the viewers attraction towards him. There is even a scene 
where de Valera and he are seen to chuckle at his political shrewdness. During their 
introductory talk, Lloyd George is unable to concede the name Republic as a title for 
the 26 counties in the South of Ireland for fear of Tory panic. Instead he comes up 
with the Irish name ‘Saorstat’ which when translated means ‘Free State’. There is a 
scene with him on a holiday break singing an Irish song. In another scene 
Birkenhead says to Collins privately that “more than anyone Lloyd George wants 
these talks to succeed”. I
Churchill however is portrayed in a less redeeming light. The film introduces 
Churchill as an imperialist. Birkenhead says to him in conversation that he doesn’t 
believe that with a hostile Turkey, it would be possible to keep the peace in Egypt, 
Mesopatamia and India. Churchill replies ruthlessly- “My dear Birkenhead, such is 
the price of Empire.”
When Lloyd George asks him should Ireland be coerced Churchill responds “I 
would not only coerce them. I would drive them into the ground.” He does say, 
however, that if Free Trade sanctions were the only problem he would not be 
prepared to go on with the repression. Though this can be put down to tactical rather 
than moral thinking. When Collins is introduced to Churchill, his facial expression 
is less than hospitable.
A snippet of George V.s famous speech is heard where he says- “The future lies in
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the hands of the Irish themselves ”
The film paints Birkenhead in very attractive colours. His political trilemma is 
explained, whereby he is torn between his responsibilities to the coalition 
government to the unionists and to the Irish people, and how he can’t force the 
unionists by arms to comply with the party’s decisions because the British people 
wouldn’t stand for it. The mutual affinity between Collins and Birkenhead is given 
attention. Birkenhead addresses Collins informally by calling him “Mick”. In one 
of their informal conversations Brikenhead’s humanity is highlighted. He says to 
Collins that the killing must stop. When Collins quizzes him as to what changed his 
mind Birkenhead replies- “You did, you made me realise that you can’t keep Ireland 
in a permanent state of subjugation. We must not fail for that sake of both 
countries.”
The focus of Collins’ sexual interest in this film is Lady Lavery. Though they are 
never seen to be physically intimate the scenes which they share have romantic 
connotations in their language and in the soft background music which compliments 
their conversation. Unlike Jordan’s film, this production refrains from depicting 
Collins as a monygomous Catholic. When he is first invited to John Lavery’s to get 
his portrait pointed he says to a young woman- “I hear Lady Lavery is a bit of a 
stunner”. The young woman tells him that she thought he was taken for, to which 
he replies “Don’t believe all you hear.” The likes of this subtle insight proved to be 
too much for Jordan to include. Collins is seen as negotiator rather than guerrilla 
leader in this film. This is inevitable considering its focus is the Treaty negotiations. 
Yet the film doesn’t avail of this as an excuse to conceal Collins’s potential 
ruthlessness. The film begins with one of Collins’ men arranging an assassination. 
This is, however, more than balanced by the following scene which show Black and 
Tans entering a house by force and shooting someone. Collins himself is seen with 
a gun in his hand going through a roadblock though he didn’t have cause to use it. 
Frustrated at being requested to go to London for the negotiations, Collins on 
entering an I.R.B. meeting is told by one of his men that a bike will be in its usual 
place. A menacing Collins turns to his associates and shouts glaringly. “I am no 
longer man on a bike. Have a car ready!!!” This is more in the bones of the rough 
and ready and potentially ruthless Collins than is Jordan’s creation. During the 
meeting Collins wrestles Boland. This scene is accompanied by strong and
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menacing music. Boland, half-seriously calls him a “mad bastard”. Collins just 
laughs. Within a few seconds Collins has turned his mind back to business again. 
A wrestling scene between Collins and Boland occurs in the Jordan film, but it is a 
lot more playful than this one.
At a dinner party hosted by Lady Lavery, Collins terrifies an old British official who 
had held a prominent position in Ireland during the War of Independence, by saying- 
“We had you surrounded [he points his fingers at him in the shape of the gun], but I 
called them off. It seemed such a brave thing to do.”
The film suggests Collins’s intention to continue illegitimate activity in the North 
after any treaty that excluded it from Irish control, when he says at an I.R.B. 
meeting that it is “ up to us not the British to remove [the Border]”.
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CONCLUSION
Though they are expressed in various degrees of dilution, all of the biographers 
impose the same basic ideals in their history writing. These ideals see violence 
justified when it can realistically benefit their progression. It is my opinion that all 
biographies are written in part as a justification of this stance. The biographers 
generally spend a lot more time discussing the War of Independence than the Civil 
War. This is probably because the former is a lot more straight - forward to their 
stance than is the latter. Beaslai is the ultimate example of how straight forward the 
War of Independence was. The British are the evil enemy whilst the Irish are 
glorified. The Irish delayed as long as they possibly could before violence became 
necessary. The suppression of their country made the use of violence inevitable 
from a realistic nationalist perspective. The Volunteers are described almost 
homogeneously as gentlemen. Their ruthlessness is almost completely avoided. On 
those very rare occasions when it is portrayed it is never described graphically and 
is always accompanied by a balancing factor. Collins is the focus of Beaslai’s 
nationalist aspirations. His character is complimented to the point of hero-worship 
with particular emphasis on his humanity and nobility. Consequently his capacity 
for ruthlessness is almost denied.
His association with drink and women are left out of the equation. His political 
importance at certain stages throughout his life is often exaggerated. He is the least 
willing of the biographers to discuss Collins’ negative traits. The close personal and 
professional bond that he had with Collins probably contributed to the creation of 
these distortions and selective descriptions. In contrast to his treatment of the Irish
I
guerrilla networks and their architect, his assessment of the British is, of all the 
biographers, the most condemnatory and vengeful in its perspective. Illogically the 
British are condemned uniformly for their violence whilst the Irish are applauded 
uniformly for their brave fighting spirit and ability. An awful lot of his biographies 
consist of descriptions of atrocities and brutalities committed by the British. 
Though in expressing his believe that violent behaviour can be justified, he is 
sometimes unintentionally revealing. He spends a lot less time discussing the Civil 
War and what he does say is slightly more candid. Ye he still needs a villain so as to 
justify Collins’ counter-attack on the Republicans. He says that the illusioned 
behaviour of the Republicans necessitated the counter-attack. Again it is seen to be
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an essential reaction for a realist to take. Even his final tribute to Collins plays as a 
criticism of the Republicans. However he does portray them in a more sympathic 
way than the British. They are allowed to respect and adore Collins for example.
De Valera is of course Beaslai’s particular villain, when it comes to the instigation of 
the Civil War.
Collins’ humanity and heartache is described in detail when it comes to having to 
fight and bury his old comrades. While Beaslai admits that the Free Staters’s 
behaviour was not emaculate, he erases Collins from being anyway personally 
responsible for this. Nor does he comment significantly on Collins and the Northern 
situation. Collins’ personality is the personification of Beaslai’s believes.
He even inflates the British as still being very relevant enemies who wanted to 
reconquer Ireland. Rather than accept the Civil War as an inevitable implosion of a 
nationalism that indoctrinated as its only unifying force a policy of violence, Beaslai 
is still pressing to identify good forces from bad forces even though this time its s 
within nationalism.
O’ Connor is similar to Beaslai in his glorification of Collins at the expense of certain 
character truths, yet his Lilliputian analogy provides for a more critical commentary 
on the country as a whole. He doesn’t praise the Irish as an entity as Beaslai tends 
to do. He accepts that the British administration was varied in its components. His 
criticism of the British is, however, nearly as strong as Beaslai’s, but he is more 
liberal in providing information about the Irish activities during the War of 
Independence. Yet the idea of violence being made necessary is again emphasised. 
His targets when it comes to the Civil War are the upper echelons of the Republican 
movement and whilst he is very reserved on de Valera he does say that he was one 
of the main instigators of the Civil War. Outside of this he shows a lot of sympathy 
for both factions in the Civil War. So again there is a definite group of people 
responsible for the Civil War. Collins and his work is allowed to remain totally 
above,repute. Even though O’ Connor proves to be critical of certain decisions they 
are nonetheless justified. When Collins finally decided to attack the Republicans it is 
put down to a nobel trust in democracy. His only references to the North deal with 
conspiracies concocted by high up British officials to create anarchy there.
O’ Connor’s final tribute to Collins sees violence as an integral part of the genius he 
applauds. This says a lot about O’ Connor and the motivations for this type of 
history writing in general.
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Forester is different from the other biographers in that she is sympalhic to most of 
the leading British figures to whom she refers. Yet somewhat paradoxically it is still
t
Britain’s higher administration thats he holds totally responsible fore the violent 
situation in Ireland at the time. She says that the British army were by and large 
civilised and she had mixed feelings about the Auxiliaries. This however is balanced 
by her long criticisms of the Black and Tans. The I.R.A. were by contrast a highly 
disciplined force. Their reaction to the British is seen to be a necessary one. All 
bloodshed was the responsibility of the British in the sense that violence begets 
violence. She is much more discrete in her descriptions of violence coming from the 
Irish side,j2ut sill manages to be both intentionally and untentionally revealing in the 
area. She totally glorifies the Irish fighter and tends to attack those Irish whom she 
considered to be non-nationalists or moderates. In this aspect, she like O’ Connor is 
willing to condemn certain aspects of Irish society.
Like Beaslai and O’ Connor, she resorts to an outright glorification of Collins’ 
character to represent the ideal of her own type of nationalism. Forester doesn’t deal 
with de Valera significantly in her work and what she does say to him can be taken 
as complimentary. Therefore he is not seen to be Collins’ foil when it comes to the 
cause of the Civil War. '
The main forces behind the Republican side are seen to lack political conviction, their 
motivations stemming from youthful nervous energies and personal animosities. It 
is these factors which she seems to hold mainly responsible for the Civil War. Her 
accounts of the violence on both sides, though limited is balanced. She doesn’t go 
into much detail about the North but what she does say under- estimates Collins’ 
activity there.
Ryan admits that the ruthlessness was mutual between both sides during the War of 
Independence even if his descriptions insult the British side more than the Irish one. 
He is however still willing to sympathise with certain British characters. Ryan who 
wais personally acquainted with Collins glorifies him to a hyperbolic extent but at the 
same time gives an honest earthiness to his character, which a lot of the other 
biographers have failed to do. In this depiction of the Civil War he represents the 
Republican side mainly through the view of three Republican characters. These are 
portrayed as being sincere but ultimately illusioned. They are allowed human 
qualities and a degree of pathos however. Rather than being committed or a form of
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violent nationalism based on a realistic perspective they were merely committed to a 
nationalism based on idealism and tradition. This is the case with all the 
biographers. The influence of women and a certain collective Irish mentality based 
on mediocrity are the two other main negative forces he attributes to the instigation 
of Civil War. The notable absence of women in the other biographies (excluding 
Coogan’s) and Ryan’s extreme rebuke of them tends to say something about a kind 
of combined form of nationalist psyche. It is expressed through dialogue that the 
Free Staters were as badly behaved as the Republicans during the Civil War. 
Collins however is still the forces of glorification as all of the three main Republican 
representatives have good things to say about him. Because this work is based on 
the ground level neither de Valera or the North are dealt with.
O’ Broin is different from the other biographers in that he will criticise Collins and 
his network without feeling the necessity of justifying these criticisms all the time (In 
many respects he is the most critical of Collins and his network). Nor does he 
attempt to humanise every violent act coming from the Irish side. He is critical of the 
British without ever being excessive. However he is still stuck in the others tradition 
when it comes to excluding women and drink form the equation. When it comes to 
the Civil War he refrains from excessive condemnation and is yet subtly but 
effectively critical of the Republicans. This subtle form of criticism is even 
expressed in his final tribute to Collins. Collins’ dilemmas at having to fight his old 
comrades is again emphasised as is his humanity throughout the Civil War. He 
refrains from going into too much detail about the North but does say that the actions 
taken by the nationalists up there were justified. He is discrete on de Valera. O’ 
Broin is the most reserved in expressing his nationalists agenda. He frees himself 
from a lot though not all of the reservations the others tend to abide by. The 
objectivity he applies into his nationalist argument is perhaps even more disturbing in 
its acceptance of ruthlessness than are the others in their subjective attempts at 
justifying ruthlessness.
Whilst Coogan’s research is reliable, he spends a lot more time describing atrocities 
committed by the British side than by the Irish side. However his wealth of 
information provides a more wholesome picture of the British administration than 
other biographies even if this information is expressed in a biast direction. Therefore 
British policy and activity is seen to be generally barbaric yet it is not portrayed as
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stemming from a cohesive entity. On the other hand, when negative behaviour from 
the Irish is described it is nearly always balanced with additional material that puts 
the British in a worse light. Therefore, while Coogan is willing to be honest in his 
provisions of information he tries to direct this information into a context that 
camouflages Irish violence. Collins again is the zenith of Coogan’s nationalist 
stance. He doesn’t suffer from the same restraints as the others when it comes to 
discussing Collins and the vices of Irish Catholic nationalism such as alcohol and 
sexuality, (he is also the only one of the biographers to go into detail about the active 
participation of women in nationalist pursuits). He is willing to be critical of Collins 
but his criticisms are nearly always balanced. When discussing Collins’ 
ruthlessness he provides anecdotes which balance this harshness with a more 
amenable side to his personality. Consequently the accounts of this ruthlessness are 
transformed from becoming negative to almost positive comments. The ruthless 
actions of Collins and the Irish side are balanced by the realities of the situation. 
Alot of the biography is spent outlying Collins’ qualities and humanity. Like several 
of the other biographers Coogan's sometimes shocking without it being his 
intention.
When it comes to the Civil War de Valera is the arch-villian. As in Beaslai’s works, 
by the time the Civil War is discussed de Valera’s character has already been built up 
to this position. The other Republican leadership is described as being fanatical 
without possessing a firm grasp on political reality. Coogan doesn’t really blame the 
Republican recruits for the Civil War. They are described as young and insincere in 
their convictions. Collins is seen to be tortured with the idea of having to fight his 
old comrades. This again overrides the descriptions of negative behaviour coming 
from the Free Staters. He is not afraid to spend a whole chapter discussing the 
controversial area of Collins’ actions in the North after the signing of the Treaty. 
However his form of nationalist thinking allows him to justify these actions despite 
the resultant further loss of life on both sides in the six counties.
The type of nationalism discussed in this thesis is not merely one based on culture 
and identity. With a lot of provocation coming from outside of this insular island, it 
has become a lot more sinister in its nature. However it is not the only form of 
nationalism that existed in Ireland at the time, or that has been subscribed to in later 
years. There exists a more passive appreciation of culture accompanied with an
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inevitable sense of identification with others who belong to this same culture. These 
assets of heritage and belonging don’t have to be considered more important than 
human life. Ghandi and Martin Luther King fought for the rights of the people they 
were identified with. Infact they dedicated their lives to this pursuit. Yet they never 
considered it to be worth the taking of one human life, except of course their own. 
The Republicans who broke away from Collins after the signing of the Treaty are 
blamed in different ways by the biographers for starting the Civil War. Whereas 
they claim that the War of Independence was started because violence begets 
violence, I would claim that the Civil War was a continuation of this violent cycle, 
and I rebuke all contributors to it. Excluding their strategies I would not decipher the 
Free Staters from the Republicans. The I.R.A. activity and mentality of today stems 
from Collins’ guerrilla networks and way of thinking. Even back then Cathal 
Brugha had intended bombing British Civilians. This cancerous way of thinking has 
effected the biographers, though some more than others. Their writings are moulded 
and directed. Their accounts of history are not as they should be - free and unlimited 
by protocol.
‘History, if learned properly, can develop those qualities of critical judgment, of 
detachment of intellectual and emotional self-control, of seeing oneself and one’s 
community in perspective, that are essential to good citizenship. At its best, it is one 
of the great learning experiences.’
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CONCLUSION II
I
Jordan has used his artistic licence to simplify a period in Irish history. His 
argument for simplifying this history is that its actual complexity would otherwise 
drown the cinematic experience. This is used to the nationalist advantage however 
by creating a very black and white scenario. The calls of drama demand an 
identifiable villain. The end result of Jordan’s work is that the British are seen to be 
totally responsible for the activities during the War of Independence. They are 
portrayed as an homogeneous menace. The assassination of British officials is 
nearly always justified and sometimes trivialised through the use of humour. There 
is not one sympathic British character in the entire film. Jordan shows a reticence to 
portray the Irish side as being capable of ruthlessness. Collins is the personification 
of the nationalist pursuit. The film is spend describing him as an unblemished 
romantic, and loyal friend whilst replacing his ruthlessness and his capacity to be
forceful with his own associates with an over-abundance of humanity.
1
The film is made identify with him as the film comes totally from his perspective. 
Through his trustworthy conversations the viewer learns that war with the British 
was inevitable. Again, it is the reality of the situation that forces him and his 
network towards violent means.
De Valera is the identifiable villain responsible for the Civil War. All his screen time 
is spent highlighting his negative traits. These are expressed in a very blatant and 
uncharacteristically unambiguous fashion. He is not held directly responsible for 
Collins’ assassination however. Indeed, I have felt obliged to spend time in the 
thesis dismissing allegations to the contrary. A new villain is required for this. He 
comes in the form of a youthful assassin whose one-dimensional character is 
portrayed as the very essence of evil. The prospect of violent nationalism gone 
wrong is detoured by the presence of these two villainous entities. The irregulars as 
a whole are not attacked. Their only other significant representative in the film is 
Harry Boland who epitomises the sympathetic character.
Like with the biographers, the form of violent nationalism based on realistic 
calculation to which Collins subscribed is never tarnished, not even by the Civil 
War. There is, like in the biographies, a convenient target like a cancer that can be
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cut out, leaving behind and unblemished nationalist anatomy. The only scene of 
Free Stater ruthlessness portrayed in the film is eclipsed by one of Collins’ emotional 
breakdowns. Infact the whole of the Civil War seems to be used in the film to 
express Collins’ pain at having to fight his old comrades. Somewhat predictably, 
there is no reference to Collins’ underhanded activities in the North. Instead it is 
assumed he has totally accepted peaceful methods for the further progression of 
nationalism beyond the boarder.
Eoghan Harris of ‘The Irish Times’, has launched an attack on the Irish media for 
what he considers to be an inexcusable expression of appreciation and support for 
Jordan’s film. Indeed, his attacks have turned into a campaign of almost epical 
proportions. He has been accused of masterminding the controversy and debate that 
has battled on the pages of both the Irish and British press for weeks around the 
release of the filrp. He sees the film as being a catalyst for Anglophobia which he 
considers to have suffered exponential growth since the bombing of Canary Warf. i 
The main momentous of his argument goes behind the allegation that the film has an 
‘unbending political subtext’ that ‘want to send messages to Sinn Fein.’ 2 To say 
that it was Jordan’s intention to entice I.R.A. membership when making the film is 
ridiculous. His arguments are desperately excessive, to the point where it is obvious 
that he himself has a hidden agenda. I partially agree with Sam Smyth of ‘The 
Sunday Tribune’ who said that it was the priority of certain members of the British 
establishment along with some ‘Irish Volunteers’ including Harris to defend the 
reputation of the British administration’s involvement in Irish history when 
reviewing the film’s qualities from on historical perspective. However I would be 
less willing to include as many culprits into this damnation. Sam Smyth seems to 
include those whom without going as far as to consider it a recruitment film, claim 
that it misrepresents Irish history I would not.3 True excessiveness rests with the 
likes of Kevin Myers who expresses 'a concern for susceptible school children 
viewing the film, and John Cole of ‘The New Statesman’ who asked people to 
refuse to see it, as it would have the direct result of causing more murder.4 Harris 
acquaints his argument with Paul Bew and his contributions to The Sunday Times 
of London. Bew compares ‘Michael Collins ‘ with Riefenstahl’s propaganda film 
for the Nazis- ‘Triumph of the will’. He spends most of an article defending British 
rule over Ireland during the period, to the extent of making the British look like 
guardian angels.5
It is somewhat ironic that he ends his argument by saying that historical accounts 
must be truthful. The above arguments are blatant attempts to defend Britains past. 
Harris’s main target in the media is ‘ The Tribune, ’ and there is some justification to 
his criticism. The likes of Ciaran Carty, David Hanley and Sam Smyth should be 
criticised for their completely supportive appraisals. However the renowned 
historian J.J. Lee has contributed a very mature piece to the same paper. He is 
critical of certain areas in the film which misrepresent the reality of Irish, history. 
Rather than see the film as a threat he sees it as an accessible devise from which to 
learn the art of critical analysis and so such suggests that it should be implemented 
into the Leaving Cert, history course. This sober criticism is lacking in those who 
suffer the pride ridden extremities of excessive nationalism, whether it be British or 
Irish.6 The historian John A. Murphy makes the same sober arguments about the 
realities of Irish history as Lee, and yet is one of the people singled out by Harris 
and attacked for being to lenient. Coogan makes some criticism about the absence of 
certain events (these are criticised because they limit the importance of Michael 
Collins) and is even dissatisfied with the scenes associated with Collins’ 
assassination because they apparently, directly implicate de Valera.8 This is a 
concern that has been raised by many contributors to the debates about the film (from 
Michael Collins’ nephew to members of the Fianna Fail party) and surprisingly 
Jordan has been left undefended on this issue. As I have said already in the 
conclusion, I have felt it necessary to argue this point in the thesis. Not surprisingly 
Coogan sees the portrayal of Collins in the film as being almost perfect and is, 
excluding the assassinations scenes, very happy with the portrayal of de Valera. The 
majority of the Irish press cannot be held up to too much criticism for their leniancy 
on the Jordan film, when the majority of the British press reviewed it with the same 
degree of hospitality. This could be to do with the fact that they are ignorant of Irish 
history, at least more ignorant of it than the Irish press. The Irish press are not so 
much ignorant of Michael Collins. Rather their learning about him seems to have 
been directed. If the books glorify Collins why can’t the film? If historical accounts 
could be expressed and taught without the infringements of nationalistic or 
imperialistic objectives perhaps the polar arguments in the ‘Michael Collins’ 
controversy could have become a lot more centralised.
i l l
Whilst ‘The Treaty’ is not a biopic like Jordan’s film, it’s main protagonist is 
nonetheless Michael Collins. Of all the works under discussion in the thesis it is the 
only one that totally escapes being formulaic to suit a nationalist’s justification. It is 
basically an audio-viusal documentation of events, well - rounded in its detailing. 
The only prerogative of each scene is an attempt to capture the reality of a situation. 
The British and Irish perspective are depicted with historical accuracy. The only 
sign of artistic licence taken is in the creation of certain conversations. Their purpose 
however is to create a fuller picture rather than to direct the viewers sympathies. 
Phelan provides a sympathic portrayal of de Valera in this work even though the 
Treaty period was the time when his behaviour was most detrimental to Collins’ 
form of nationalism.
His perspective is accounted for and he is seen in a positive light several times 
throughout the film. When he is criticised it is for the reality of his actions rather 
than an attempt to depict him as Collins’ foil. This film, therefore, manages to 
capture the complexity of historical reality rather than the simplicity of emotional 
drama. Nor is the British administration utilised in any way for its villainous 
propensity. The viewer learns their perspective and dilemmas. There characters are 
individualised whereby the film is critical of certain personalities and more 
complimentary to others. Even the portrayal of Collins is balanced. His bravery and 
charm are highlighted but so is his ruthlessness. His intentions for the North are 
also referred to. Finally, Phelan doesn’t find it necessary to subscribe to the 
virtuous myth of monogamy.
I
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CONCLUSION II - END NOTES
1. The Sunday Times. (Dublin), 17 November 1996, p. 17: Prime Time. 
(R.T.E., Dublin, November 1996)
2. Prime Time. (R.T.E.l
3. The Sunday Tribune. 10 November 1996, p. 13.
4. The New Statesman. 3 November 1996.
5. The Sunday Times. (London), 10 November 1996; Prime Time. (R.T.E.).
6. The Sunday Tribune. 3 November 1996.
|i
7. Prime Time. (R.T.E.l
8. ibid.
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